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Preface 
 
 
This report was commissioned by Oxfam-Novib (Netherlands). In 2007-2008 
world market prices for major food commodities such as grains as well as in-
puts such as fertilisers, have risen sharply to historic highs. At the same time, 
these sectors are increasingly dominated by a few large agribusiness firms. 
Civil society organisations are increasingly concerned about the potential impact 
of these two trends. The position of large companies and retailers has been 
relatively well documented. However, less documentation is available about the 
linkage of international and domestic markets, especially in poor countries such 
as those in Africa. 
 We are grateful for the guidance and kind support provided by Gine Zwart 
(Oxfam), Martin Banse (LEI) and Siemen van Berkum (LEI) as well as the useful 
feedback obtained during the expert meeting of 16 December 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
Prof Dr R.B.M. Huirne 
Director General LEI Wageningen UR 
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Summary 
 
 
In 2007-2008, world market prices for major food commodities such as grains 
as well as for inputs such as fertiliser have risen sharply to historic highs. At the 
same time, these sectors are dominated by a few large agribusiness firms. Civil 
society organisations are increasingly concerned about the potential impact of 
these two trends. The aim of this report is to provide empirical evidence that 
helps to understand the potential effects of the organisation of the world grain 
sector, the position of Multi National Enterprises (MNEs) in the grain supply 
chain, and world market pricing. This analysis is done based on a set of ques-
tions formulated by Oxfam-Novib: 
1. What are the main features of the international grain markets? 
2. What are the price trends in the international grain markets?  
3. What are the main features of leading MNEs in international grain trade and 
what are their corporate strategies? 
4. What is the position of MNEs in Sub-Saharan Africa and how are African 
farmers affected by international prices? 
5. Do MNEs or does speculation affect grain prices at international markets? 
 
International grains markets 
Global demand for grains is increasing steadily, which is matched by an increas-
ing supply, but only just. World grain stocks have decreased in the past dec-
ades, thus reducing effective supply in the world market. The USA is the major 
exporter of grains (especially maize). China is a large producer of grains, but 
exports only a small amount. 
 
High food prices 
Food prices have increased rapidly over the past years, with grains being 
among the commodities with the highest price increase. In the second half of 
2008, grain prices have declined rapidly although they remain high compared to 
pre-2006 levels. Several factors have caused the recent price fluctuations. They 
reflect underlying trends in supply and demand for agricultural commodities that 
began more than a decade ago as well as other developments that have oc-
curred more recently. 
 Grain demand has shown a rapid growth due to population growth but also, 
more recently, due to increased demand for for instance biofuels and livestock 
feed. These factors have contributed to a tightening of world balances of grains 
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over the last decade. In addition, many countries have reduced their grain 
stocks, thus reducing the buffer that could help reduce supply shocks. Weather 
conditions have been adverse in 2006 and 2007 in some major grain-producing 
areas, thus reducing world supply. Together with low stocks this has led to an 
increase in prices. Additional factors include the declining value of the US dollar, 
rising energy prices, increasing agricultural costs of production (due to higher 
fuel and fertiliser costs), growing foreign exchange holdings by major food-
importing countries, and policies adopted by some exporting and importing 
countries to mitigate their own food price inflation. The 2008 situation resem-
bled a 'perfect storm' in which different factors came together almost simulta-
neously, resulting in a peak in prices. In the last quarter of 2008, financial 
markets collapsed and a global economic downturn became clear. Grain prices 
fell steeply. Whether prices will continue to fall, or whether they will rise again in 
2009 is unclear. However, most experts agree that the volatility of prices will 
remain high in the future. The reason for this is that world stocks are still low, 
and that any change in supply will have a large effect on prices. 
 
International trade and MNEs 
World grain trade constitutes only a small share of world production (from 7% 
for rice to 18% for wheat). The global trade is handled increasingly by only a 
handful of companies. Cargill, ADM and Bunge are the major players. In the 
grains market (and food markets in general) there is a continuing trend towards 
horizontal and vertical integration. Horizontal integration consists of merging 
firms at the same level in the supply chain while vertical integration consists of 
merging firms at different stages in the supply chain (for instance input and out-
put sectors). There are several advantages to such mergers for MNEs. An im-
portant advantage is that they lead to reduced competition in global food 
markets. Large MNEs such as Cargill, ADM and Bunge engage in various col-
laborative contracts with large MNEs that specialise in inputs (such as agro-
chemicals and seeds). Such collaborations have been termed 'food clusters'. 
These food clusters wield much power in terms of decisions about what is pro-
duced, what is consumed and on what basis these decision are made. 
 Although such food clusters are increasing in importance, there is relatively 
little recent data on them. The authors recommend therefore more detailed re-
search on the role of large MNEs such as Cargill, ADM and Bunge in interna-
tional grain trade as well as more updated information on the main food 
clusters. 
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Supply chain linkages 
While the global grain trade is increasingly characterised by horizontal and ver-
tical integration, which has been facilitated by trade liberalisation, producers all 
over the world face increasing competition. Technological progress has in-
creased agricultural productivity, but has also depressed prices (by increasing 
supply). A large number of competitive and relatively powerless producers face 
a few large powerful buyers. These factors explain why throughout the world, the 
net incomes of producers have not increased much or have even decreased. 
 In Sub-Saharan Africa, the situation is somewhat different because the large 
MNEs are hardly active in the grain sector. Most African grain markets are 
characterised by a high fragmentation: trade is carried out by a multitude of 
small traders. Domestic grain markets are highly influenced by domestic and 
regional supply and demand factors rather than international factors. A failed 
harvest in one region, for instance, pushes up prices in that region as well as in 
neighbouring regions. Many grains produced and traded in Africa are non-
tradable (such as sorghum, millet), which means there is no international market 
for them. Transaction and transport costs are relatively high in Africa, which 
leads to low price transmission i.e. high international prices are not translated to 
high local prices or with a substantial lag. Although international grain prices 
have a limited effect on African domestic markets, the high fertiliser prices in 
the international market did have a significant effect on local fertiliser prices, 
which increased considerably. Many farmers in Africa are net buyers of food, 
and thus they will not benefit from higher grain prices, while they are hurt by 
higher fertiliser prices. 
 
Speculation and profits of MNEs 
Based on the data and research analysed in this report, we found no clear evi-
dence that speculation by index funds on the futures commodity markets has 
led to higher prices. First, while there has been an increase in speculative in-
vestments in the futures commodity markets, total trade in the futures markets 
(including non-speculative trade) has increased as well, so that the share of 
speculative trade has not increased much. Second, very high price increases 
have been found in sectors that do not have future markets. Third, a bubble in 
storable commodities (such as grains) should have been accompanied by an in-
crease in storage, which has not been the case. Finally, the number of futures 
and derivative contracts that can be created is limitless, therefore simply ob-
serving that there has been a rise in speculative investment does not automati-
cally prove that this has led to higher prices. Two in-depth studies using data of 
the main futures market (Chicago Board of Trade) have concluded that there is 
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no strong statistical evidence to support the claim that the increase in specula-
tive investments has, indeed, led to higher prices. 
 There has been concern about the fact that the futures and cash prices on 
futures commodity markets no longer converged (the futures prices were higher 
than cash prices). This has also been attributed to speculation. However, again, 
there is no evidence that this is the cause. The cause may also lie in the storage 
and freight costs which have risen considerably as demand for commodities in-
creased and fuel cost soared. 
 There is no evidence either that the dominant MNEs active in the interna-
tional grain trade (Bunge, Cargill and ADM) have pushed up prices. They would 
only be able to do this by hoarding commodities such as grains on a large 
scale, and the data shows that in fact, stocks have decreased in the past years. 
There is more evidence that they did profit from high commodity prices al-
though the evidence is somewhat mixed. In some cases they have clearly been 
able to profit: demand for commodities was high and those firms operating 
close to farmers could increase their margins. However, in some cases the high 
commodity prices resulted in a net loss because the operational costs of MNEs 
have also increased. 
 Whether the MNEs could profit depends on two factors. The first is timing: 
whether they could buy at low prices and sell against high prices. The second is 
the power that the MNEs can exert in setting margins. The large agribusinesses 
have global sourcing networks that provides them the flexibility to source where 
prices are relatively low, and to adjust manufacturing activities to respond to 
shifts in a dynamic global marketplace. On the second account, the main agri-
businesses dominate a large share of the market and own not just one segment 
of the chain but a complex that includes input as well as output sectors. This 
has two advantages. If output prices rise (for instance for grains), the opera-
tional costs for MNEs may rise, but at the same time the demand for inputs 
(such as fertiliser) will also rise (assuming that farmers will start growing more 
crops when prices rise), leading to higher sales in that sector, and vice versa. 
Also, the integration of a whole chain puts MNEs into a good position to deter-
mine margins. 
 To build on these advantages, the MNEs continue to expand and merge. The 
trend towards free trade has clearly facilitated their ability to source globally. 
The MNEs are therefore able to deal well with higher price volatility. By contrast, 
farmers will face more difficulties when prices fluctuate, especially in the face of 
increasing competition in a free trade environment. 
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Conclusion 
This report concludes that food prices in 2007-2008 increased as a result of a 
combination of different factors, in which a decrease in world grain stocks 
played a major role. The report finds no evidence that the increase in food 
prices was caused by speculation either in futures markets or by MNEs. It also 
finds no evidence that MNEs have driven up prices by exploiting their dominant 
position in world grain trade. It has found, however, that MNEs have in several 
cases been able to significantly profit from high demand and high prices. It also 
finds that MNEs are able to be flexible and make use of different opportunities 
with respect to sourcing, pricing et cetera, and to spread risk. They can achieve 
this due to their dominant position in world grain markets and due to the fact 
that they have integrated the inputs as well as the outputs sectors into large 
agri-business complexes that span various countries. This is illustrated by the 
fact that the fourth quarter of 2008 - when prices for grains and fertilisers fell, 
and the financial markets tumbled - MNEs were still able to make profits (al-
though not on all segments). 
 This report is a quick scan of the world grain trade, the role of MNEs and the 
effect on Sub-Saharan Africa. It recommends to extend the analysis to Asia, 
where the MNEs are increasing their influence, both in the grain sector and in 
the input sector. 
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Samenvatting 
De rol van multinationals in internationale graanmarkten 
 
 
In 2007-2008 zijn de wereldmarktprijzen voor belangrijke voedselproducten zo-
als granen en voor inputs zoals kunstmest sterk gestegen tot historische hoog-
tes. Tegelijkertijd worden deze sectoren in toenemende mate gedomineerd door 
een paar grote agribusinessbedrijven. Er bestaat een groeiende zorg bij maat-
schappelijke organisaties over deze twee trends. Het doel van dit rapport is om 
feiten boven tafel te krijgen die helpen een beter beeld te scheppen van de or-
ganisatie van de internationale graansector, de posities van Multinationals  
(MN's) en prijszetting in wereldmarkten. De analyse is gedaan op basis van een 
aantal vragen die geformuleerd zijn door Oxfam-Novib: 
1. Wat zijn de belangrijkste kenmerken van de internationale graanmarkten? 
2. Wat zijn de prijstrends in de internationale graanmarkten?  
3. Wat zijn de belangrijkste kenmerken van de grootste MN's in de internation-
ale graanhandel en wat zijn hun bedrijfsstrategieën? 
4. Wat is de positie van MN's in Sub-Sahara Afrika en wat is het effect van de 
internationale prijzen op Afrikaanse boeren? 
5. Beïnvloeden MN's en/of speculatie de graanprijzen in internationale mark-
ten? 
 
Internationale graanmarkten 
De vraag naar granen is wereldwijd gestaag aan het groeien, waaraan nog maar 
net wordt voldaan door een groeiend aanbod. Graanvoorraden in de wereld zijn 
gedaald in de afgelopen decennia, wat het effectieve aanbod heeft verlaagd. De 
Verenigde Staten zijn de belangrijkste exporteur van granen (vooral van maïs). 
China is een grote producent van granen, maar exporteert slechts weinig. 
 
Hoge voedselprijzen 
Voedselprijzen zijn snel gestegen de afgelopen jaren, waarbij granen tot de pro-
ducten hoorden die de hoogste stijging hebben doorgemaakt. In de tweede helft 
van 2008 zijn graanprijzen snel gedaald, hoewel ze hoog zijn gebleven verge-
leken met de niveaus van voor 2006. Verschillende factoren hebben tot de re-
cente prijsfluctuaties geleid. Ze reflecteren zowel langetermijnvraag- en 
aanbodsontwikkelingen van agrarische producten als andere, meer recentere 
ontwikkelingen. 
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 De vraag naar granen is gegroeid door bevolkingsgroei, maar ook door de 
vraag naar bio-energie en veevoeder. Deze factoren hebben bijgedragen tot een 
krappere wereldbalans van granen gedurende het laatste decennium. Daarbij 
komt nog dat veel landen hun graanvoorraden hebben gereduceerd, waardoor 
de buffer is verkleind die een verlaging van het aanbod zou kunnen opvangen. 
Weersomstandigheden zijn slecht geweest gedurende 2006 en 2007 in som-
mige grote graanproducerende gebieden, waardoor het wereldaanbod werd  
gereduceerd. In combinatie met kleine voorraden heeft dit geleid tot een  
prijsstijging. Bijkomende factoren zijn een lagere dollarwaarde, hogere brand-
stofprijzen, hogere landbouwproductiekosten (door hoge brandstofprijzen en 
kunstmestprijzen), het aanhouden van buitenlandse deviezen door belangrijke 
voedselimporterende landen en beleid dat door sommige exporterende en im-
porterende landen werd gevoerd om eigen prijsinflatie te beheersen. De situatie 
in 2008 is te vergelijken met een 'perfecte storm' waarbij verschillende factoren 
samenvielen en hebben geleid tot een piek in prijzen. In het laatste kwartaal van 
2008 kregen de financiële markten een klap en een wereldwijde recessie werd 
duidelijk. Graanprijzen daalden sterk. Of prijzen verder zullen dalen, of dat ze 
weer zullen stijgen in 2009, is niet duidelijk. Toch verwachten de meeste ex-
perts dat de prijsvolatiliteit hoog zal blijven in de toekomst. De reden hiervoor is 
dat wereldgraanvoorraden nog steeds klein zijn en dat elke verandering in aan-
bod een groot effect op prijzen zal hebben. 
 
Internationale handel en MN's 
De wereldgraanhandel beslaat maar een klein deel van de wereldproductie (van 
7% voor rijst tot 18% voor tarwe). De wereldhandel wordt in toenemende mate 
uitgevoerd door een klein aantal bedrijven. Cargill, ADM en Bunge zijn de belan-
grijkste spelers. In de graanmarkten (en voedselmarkten in het algemeen) is een 
groeiende tendens te zien van horizontale en verticale integratie. Horizontale in-
tegratie houdt in dat bedrijven in hetzelfde segment van de keten fuseren, terwijl 
verticale integratie betekent dat bedrijven in verschillende segmenten van de ke-
ten fuseren (bijvoorbeeld input- en outputsectoren). Er zijn verschillende voor-
delen van dit soort fusies voor bedrijven. Een belangrijk voordeel is dat ze leiden 
tot verminderde concurrentie in wereldvoedselmarkten. Grote MN's zoals Car-
gill, ADM en Bunge nemen deel aan verschillende samenwerkingsverbanden 
(contracten) met grote MNE's die gespecialiseerd zijn in inputsectoren (zoals 
agrochemie en zaden). Zulke samenwerkingsverbanden worden ook wel 'voed-
selclusters' genoemd. Deze voedselclusters hebben veel macht wat betreft bes-
lissingsbevoegdheid over wat er wordt geproduceerd en geconsumeerd en op 
welke basis deze beslissingen worden genomen. 
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 Hoewel zulke voedselclusters steeds belangrijker worden, is er relatief wei-
nig informatie over te vinden. Wij bevelen daarom aan om meer gedetailleerd 
onderzoek te doen over de rol van grote MN's zoals Cargill, ADM en Bunge in 
de internationale graanhandel evenals meer recente informatie te vergaren over 
de belangrijkste voedselclusters. 
 
Aanbodsketens 
Terwijl de wereldgraanhandel steeds meer wordt gekenmerkt door horizontale 
en verticale integratie, wat is vergemakkelijkt door handelsliberalisatie, worden 
wereldwijd producenten geconfronteerd met grotere concurrentie. Technolo-
gische vooruitgang heeft agrarische productiviteit verhoogd, maar heeft ook tot 
lagere prijzen geleid (door een vergroot aanbod). Een groot aantal concur-
rerende en relatief machteloze producenten staan tegenover een klein aantal 
machtige opkopers. Deze factoren verklaren waarom over de hele wereld het 
netto-inkomen van producenten niet of nauwelijks is gestegen. 
 In Sub-Sahara Afrika is de situatie enigszins anders omdat de grote MN's 
nauwelijks actief zijn in de graansector. De meeste Afrikaanse graanmarkten 
worden gekenmerkt door een hoge fragmentatie: handel wordt uitgevoerd door 
een groot aantal kleine handelaren. Binnenlandse graanmarkten worden in veel 
grotere mate beïnvloed door binnenlandse en regionale vraag- en aanbodsfac-
toren dan door internationale factoren. Een mislukte oogst in een bepaalde re-
gio, bijvoorbeeld, doet de prijzen in die regio stijgen, evenals in de aangren-
zende regio's. Ten tweede, veel granen die verbouwd en verhandeld worden in 
Afrika zijn niet verhandelbaar op de wereldmarkt ('non-tradables' zoals sorgum 
of gierst). Ten derde, transactie- en transportkosten zijn relatief hoog in Afrika, 
wat leidt tot een lage prijstransmissie (hoge internationale prijzen worden niet 
vertaald in hoge lokale prijzen, of met een grote vertraging). Hoewel internatio-
nale graanprijzen in beperkte mate effect hebben op Afrikaanse binnenlandse 
markten, hebben de hoge kunstmestprijzen wel een significant effect gehad op 
lokale kunstmest prijzen, die sterk zijn gestegen. Veel boeren in Afrika zijn netto 
kopers van voedsel, en zij zullen dus niet profiteren van hogere graanprijzen, 
terwijl zij wel getroffen worden door hogere kunstmestprijzen. 
 
Speculatie en winsten van MN's 
Gebaseerd op de data en het onderzoek dat in dit rapport is geanalyseerd, vin-
den wij geen duidelijk bewijs voor het argument dat speculatie door indexfond-
sen op de termijnmarkten geleid hebben tot hogere prijzen. Hoewel er een 
stijging is geweest in speculatieve investeringen in agrarische termijnmarkten, 
is de totale handel in de termijnmarkten ook gestegen (met inbegrip van niet-
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speculatieve handel). Ten tweede zijn er sterkte prijsstijgingen geconstateerd in 
markten waar geen termijnmarkten bestaan. Ten derde, een 'zeepbel' in prijzen 
van producten die opgeslagen kunnen worden (zoals granen) zou moeten sa-
mengaan met een grotere opslag van granen, wat niet het geval is geweest. 
Ten slotte, de hoeveelheid termijnzaken en derivaten die gecreëerd kunnen wor-
den is onbeperkt en daarom is de observatie dat er een stijging in speculatieve 
investeringen is geweest, geen overtuigende reden om te stellen dat deze dus 
tot hogere prijzen heeft geleid. Twee grondige studies die gebruik hebben ge-
maakt van data van de belangrijkste termijnmarkten (de Chicago Board of  
Trade) concluderen dat er geen afdoende statistisch bewijs is om de stelling te 
onderbouwen dat speculatieve investeringen inderdaad hebben geleid tot ho-
gere prijzen. 
 Er is zorg geuit over de ontwikkeling dat de prijs op de termijnmarkt ('futures 
price') en de geldende prijs ('cash price') niet langer samenvallen (de prijzen op 
de termijnmarkt blijven hoger dan de geldende prijs). Dit wordt ook toegeschre-
ven aan speculatie. Toch hebben wij geen bewijs gevonden dat dit het geval is. 
De oorzaak kan namelijk ook liggen in opslag en vrachtkosten die aanzienlijk zijn 
gestegen omdat de vraag naar goederen is gestegen en brandstofkosten een 
hoge vlucht hebben genomen. 
 Wij hebben ook geen bewijs gevonden dat de drie grote multinationals die 
actief zijn in de graanhandel (te weten Bunge, Cargill and ADM) de prijzen heb-
ben omhooggestuwd. Zij zouden dit alleen hebben kunnen doen wanneer zij op 
grote schaal graanvoorraden zouden hebben aangelegd en de gegevens tonen 
aan dat graanvoorraden juist zijn gedaald afgelopen jaren.  
 Er zijn meer argumenten te vinden voor het feit dat de multinationals hebben 
geprofiteerd van de hoge prijzen hoewel het bewijs gemengd is. In sommige 
gevallen hebben zij duidelijk kunnen profiteren: de vraag naar graan was hoog 
en die bedrijven die dicht bij boeren opereerden hebben hun marges kunnen ver-
groten. Aan de andere kant, in sommige gevallen zorgden de hoge prijzen voor 
een nettoverlies omdat de operationele kosten van sommige multinationals 
daardoor ook omhooggingen. 
 Of de multinationals hebben kunnen profiteren hangt samen met twee fac-
toren. De eerste factor is timing: of ze tegen lage prijzen konden opkopen en 
daarna tegen hoge prijzen konden verkopen. De tweede factor is de macht die 
multinationals kunnen uitoefenen om marges te stellen. De grote agribusiness-
bedrijven hebben een mondiaal sourcing netwerk dat hen de flexibiliteit geeft om 
daar aan te kopen waar prijzen relatief laag zijn, en om het productieproces aan 
te passen zodat ze kunnen voldoen aan veranderingen in een dynamische, mon-
diale marktplaats. Met betrekking tot het tweede punt, de grote agribusiness-
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bedrijven domineren een groot deel van de markt en zijn eigenaar niet van 
slechts een segment van de keten maar van een complex dat zowel input- als 
outputsectoren beslaat. Dit heeft twee voordelen. Ten eerste, als outputprijzen 
stijgen, zoals voor graan, stijgen weliswaar de operationele kosten van MN's, 
maar tegelijkertijd zal de vraag naar inputs, zoals voor kunstmest, waarschijnlijk 
ook stijgen (aannemende dat boeren meer zullen produceren als prijzen stijgen), 
wat zal leiden tot hogere verkopen in die sector en vice versa. Ten tweede, door 
de integratie van een hele keten bevindt de MN zich in een goede positie om 
marges vast te stellen. 
 Om voort te bouwen op genoemde voordelen, blijven de multinationals uit-
breiden en fuseren. De trend naar meer vrije handel heeft hun vermogen ver-
groot om mondiaal in te kopen (sourcing). De multinationals zijn daarom beter in 
staat om hogere prijsvolatiliteit te hanteren. Daarentegen zullen boeren het 
moeilijker hebben als prijzen fluctueren, vooral in het geval van grotere concur-
rentie door handelsliberalisatie. 
 
Conclusie 
Dit rapport concludeert dat de voedselprijzen in 2007-2008 gestegen zijn door 
een combinatie van verschillende factoren, waarin een daling van graanvoor-
raden een belangrijke rol heeft gespeeld. 
 Het rapport vindt geen bewijs dat de toename in wereldgraanprijzen is vero-
orzaakt door speculatie in de termijnmarkten noch door MN's. Het vindt ook 
geen bewijs dat MN's prijzen hebben opgedreven door hun dominante positie in 
de wereldgraanmarkt te exploiteren. Het rapport vindt wel aanwijzingen dat 
MN's in bepaalde gevallen flink hebben kunnen profiteren van een hoge vraag en 
hoge prijzen voor zowel graan als inputs zoals kunstmest. Het rapport con-
cludeert ook dat multinationals in staat zijn geweest om flexibel te opereren en  
gebruik te maken van uiteenlopende kansen met betrekking tot sourcing, prijs-
zetting en risicospreiding. Zij hebben dit kunnen doen door gebruik te maken 
van hun dominante positie in de wereldmarkt, en door het feit dat zij zowel input- 
als outputsectoren hebben geïntegreerd tot grote agribusinesscomplexen die 
verschillende landen beslaan. Dit kan geïllustreerd worden aan de hand van het 
vierde kwartaal van 2008 - waarin prijzen voor granen en kunstmest daalden en 
de financiële markten ineenstortten - maar waarin de multinationals nog steeds 
in staat waren om winsten te behalen (hoewel niet op alle segmenten). 
 Dit rapport bestaat uit een snelle scan van de wereldgraanhandel, de rol van 
multinationals, en de situatie in Sub-Sahara Afrika. Het adviseert om de analyse 
uit te breiden naar Azië, waar de multinationals hun invloed aan het uitbreiden 
zijn, zowel in de graan- als in de inputsector. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
The past few years, world market prices for major food commodities such as 
grains1 have risen sharply to historic highs. At the same time, these sectors are 
increasingly dominated by a few large agribusiness firms. There is growing con-
cern on the part of civil society organisations on the impact of MNE positioning 
and strategies on the international grain price development. 
 The aim of this report is to provide empirical evidence that helps understand 
the impact of MNE market positioning and strategies on international grain price 
development. This analysis is done based on a set of questions formulated by 
Oxfam-Novib (based on ToR Taking away options, October 2, 2008): 
1. What are the main features of the international grain markets? 
2. What are the price trends in the international grain markets?  
3. What are the main features of leading MNEs in international grain trade and 
what are their corporate strategies? 
4. What is the position of MNEs in Sub-Saharan Africa and how are African 
farmers affected by international prices? 
5. Do MNEs or speculation affect grain prices at international markets? 
 
 Chapter 2 provides a background overview of the international grain market. 
Data are presented on quantity and value traded internationally (compared to to-
tal production), as well as historic price trends and expected price trends in the 
future. The chapter briefly explains the factors that led to the grain price in-
crease in 2007-2008. Chapter 3 presents information about the major players 
in the international grains markets. It describes the trend of increasing horizon-
tal and vertical integration of MNEs into large 'food clusters'. Chapter 4 explains 
the global supply chain linkages with a special focus on the grain supply chain in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. It explains why many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have 
not (yet) been affected much by the trends described in chapters 2 and 3. The 
report concludes with chapter 5 with an analysis on the possible role of specula-
tion and the role MNEs have played in the grain price fluctuations. 
                                                 
1 In this reports, we will use the term grains to include maize, wheat, rice and coarse grains.  
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 The information in this document is based on secondary data obtained 
through reports and databases available at LEI Wageningen UR. The research-
ers do not pretend to be complete in the presentation of the findings. Neverthe-
less, this report provides a first insight that helps understand the possible 
relation between grain prices, speculation, MNEs, supply chain linkages and 
price transmission along the chain. 
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2 Background: overview of the international 
grain markets and positions 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Food is a basic necessity. The share of poor people's income used to purchase 
food is high, and therefore food price increases are socially and politically an 
important issue. For this reason, this report tries to shed light on the possible 
relations between market concentration and the recent price trends. To be able 
to do so, a better understanding of the international grain sector and market is 
necessary. This chapter presents the basic data on the international trade of 
grains and gives an overview of recent price trends and of future projections. 
 
 
2.2 Global grain production and trade 
 
Globally, most of the domestic consumption of grains is met by domestic pro-
duction (figure 2.1) but only just. Only a few countries are net importers or ex-
porters (figure 2.2). Figure 2.1 shows that global grain stocks have decreased 
significantly in recent years, thus reducing buffers to accommodate a sudden 
drop in supply, for instance as a result of adverse weather or increase in de-
mand, for instance an increase in ethanol demand. This is one of the main fac-
tors behind the increasing, yet fluctuating grain prices. 
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Figure 2.1 World consumption, production and stocks of rice, maize, 
wheat and coarse grains 
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Figure 2.1 World consumption, production and stocks of rice, maize, 
wheat and coarse grains (continued) 
World maize
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Source: USDA, 2008. 
 
 Figure 2.2 shows that the USA is the major exporter of most grains. Be-
cause international prices are determined for a large part by demand and supply 
dynamics, the USA, as a major supplier will have a certain level of influence on 
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international prices. When the USA lowers its supply, international prices will 
likely increase, and vice versa, provided the supply change is not offset by a 
concomitant change in supply by other major exporting countries. 
 
Figure 2.2 Wheat, maize rice and coarse grains exports 2004-2008 
according to major exporters 
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Figure 2.2 Wheat, maize rice and coarse grains exports 2004-2008 
according to major exporters (continued) 
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 Although grains trade has increased since the 1980s - especially rice (figure 
2.3) - international trade in grains as a share of total production is still only 10% 
in 2008 (USDA, 2008; table 1 on p. 16). 
 
Figure 2.3 World trade in rice, maize, coarse grains and wheat  
1980-2008 (in millions of tonnes) 
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Figure 2.3 World trade in rice, maize, coarse grains and wheat  
1980-2008 (in millions of tonnes) (continued) 
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Source: USDA (2008). 
 
 Figure 2.3 shows that except for wheat, trade has started to decrease in the 
2007-08 period, which reflects a decrease in global demand. One reason for 
this may be the high prices, which reduced demand. This trend is expected to 
be reinforced by the current global recession. 
 Figure 2.4 shows the extent to which the USA is linked to other countries by 
means of trade (in this case maize). Interestingly, the USA also imports maize, 
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although much less than they export. International trade is facilitated by only a 
few MNEs, while domestic trade (not shown in figure 2.4) is mainly in the hands 
of national firms.1 Almost all the grain that moves between nations, passes 
through Cargill, ADM, or Bunge (Hendrickson and Heffernan, 2005). 
 
Figure 2.4 Export and import flows of maize from the USA to the rest of 
the world (2005) 
 
 
Source: FAOSTAT (2008). 
 
                                                 
1 In the USA, four firms - Cargill, Cenex Harvest States, ADM, and General Mills - control 60% of the 
terminal grain handling facilities, while Cargill and ADM (combined with Zen-Noh) export 81% of USA 
maize. In addition, 68% of American flour milling is controlled by three firms, including ADM, ConAgra, 
and Cargill (Hendrickson and Heffernan, 2005). 
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 Though China is not involved to a great extent in world trade at present, its 
potential influence on world prices may increase significantly in the future due to 
its huge grain production and stocks. China produces large amounts of grains, 
and hold the world's largest stocks: around 170 million tonnes in 2008 - almost 
40% of world stocks - compared to around 50 million tonnes - or 11% of world 
stocks - held by North America. By comparison, international trade of grains 
was 255 million tonnes in 2008. However, China trades only a small amount: 
exports and imports consist of less than 1% in 2008 as share of total domestic 
production (FAO, 2008a). 
 
 
2.3 Historic price trends of the global grain sector 
 
Food prices have increased rapidly over the past years, and only recently 
showed a declining trend (figures 2.5 and 2.6). As the two figures show, grain 
prices are among the commodities with the highest price increase. In the sec-
ond half of 2008, prices have declined rapidly although they remain high com-
pared to pre-2006 levels. 
 
Figure 2.5 Price index data 1990-2008 for fats and oils, grains and 
other food a) 
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a) Base year is 1990 = 100. 
Source: World Bank (2008).  
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 These high food prices need to be put into perspective, because many other 
prices (such as energy, metals and minerals and especially fertilisers) rose even 
more during the same period (figure 2.6). 
 
Figure 2.6 Price index of oil, food and other commodities 1990-2008 a) 
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Source: World Bank (2008). 
 
 It is important to note that several factors have caused the recent price fluc-
tuations. They reflect long-term underlying trends in supply and demand for ag-
ricultural commodities that began more than a decade ago as well as other 
more recent developments. 
 Part of the price fluctuation fits into the long-term trend of periodic spikes in 
prices of the four major crops (wheat, rice, maize and soy beans) since the 
1980s (Trostle, 2008). Although some of these price spikes relate to only one 
of the crops, in general the prices of all four crops rise and fall in a similar fash-
ion. This occurs because buyers can substitute among these or other commodi-
ties, whether for food use or animal feed use, and purchase whichever is 
cheaper. With the exception of the early 1970s, each period of rapidly rising 
prices was followed by a fall, back to their pre-spike level. 
 However, the recent unprecedented price peak was caused also by other 
factors, more unique to this specific time period. Figure 2.7 sums up the main 
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factors in a historical perspective. Banse et al. (2008) point out that the high 
prices reflect a 'perfect storm' in which different factors have come together 
almost simultaneously, resulting in a peak. 
 
Figure 2.7 Factors that caused price increase 1996-2008 
 
Source: Trostle (2008). 
 
 A number of long-term trends have affected the global supply and demand 
for food commodities and have led to tightening of the global supply and de-
mand balance. This, in turn has gradually put upward pressure on agricultural 
prices. There were also several short-term factors that played a role (Trostle, 
2008): 
1. An important factor has been China, which reduced its grain stocks. Also 
elsewhere, there were incentives for governments and the private sector to 
reduce stocks, for instance because stocks are expensive. The resulting low 
level of world stocks in 2007 has caused importing countries to become 
anxious about being able to obtain their future food needs, putting additional 
pressure on prices; 
2. In 2004, agricultural production costs began to rise, especially for energy 
(oil) related inputs such as fertiliser, fuel, and pesticides; 
3. Biofuels have been another factor. Production generally grew slowly until af-
ter the turn of the century. USA ethanol production began to rise more rap-
idly in 2003 and EU biodiesel production began to increase more rapidly in 
2005. The growth in biodiesel production was stimulated by government 
policies such as subsidies. Brazil and the USA account for most of the 
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world's ethanol production but Brazil uses sugarcane as a feedstock, while 
the USA uses almost exclusively maize; 
4. Beginning in 2002, the US dollar began to depreciate. As the dollar lost 
value relative to the currencies of importing countries, it reduced those 
countries' costs of importing which increased demand. Since the USA is a 
major source of many agricultural commodities, foreign countries' imports 
of commodities from the USA began to rise. This put upward pressure on 
USA prices for those commodities. Further, since the world price of major 
crops are typically denominated in US dollars, the depreciation of the dollar 
also raised prices (measured in dollars); 
5. In 2007, a number of adverse weather events affected yields across the 
globe and resulted in a drop in global average grain harvests; 
6. The lower production caused yet another decline in the global stocks-to-use 
ratio. In response to rising food prices, some countries began to take pro-
tective policy measures designed to reduce the impact of rising world food 
commodity prices on their own consumers. Such policy measures included 
export taxes, export quantitative restrictions, export bans and lower import 
tariffs. However, such measures typically force greater adjustments and 
higher prices onto global markets (therefore such policies are called 'beg-
gar-thy-neighbour' policies). 
 
 We will not go further in detail into the reasons behind the price increase be-
cause they have been described extensively in other reports (Trostle, 2008; 
Banse et al., 2008; Mitchell, 2008; Martuscelli, 2008). 
 
 
2.4 Projections of future price fluctuations 
 
The turmoil in global financial markets that started in October 2008 was re-
flected in steep price falls in all grains (figures 2.8 and 2.9), with the US dollar's 
renewed strength and declining energy prices also playing a role. The collapse 
of ocean freight rates, which was caused by both low fuel prices as well as the 
economic downturn, further reduced grain import costs and therefore import 
prices. As markets tumbled, there were reports of defaults on some earlier pur-
chases and of financing problems under a much stricter credit environment. 
Global demand is falling, consequently putting more downward pressure on 
prices (International Grains Council, 2008). 
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Figure 2.8 Spot prices at the Chicago Board of Trade (in USD) a) 
 
 
 
a) 1 bushel = 27.2 kg. 
Source: CME (2008); tinyurl.com/bnv93v.  
 
 World wheat export prices at one stage dipped to their lowest levels since 
early 2007 (figure 2.9). The decrease in prices partly reflected the recovery in 
supplies. However, there were also worries that the global economic downturn 
would affect international demand for grains. The recent falls in world prices 
triggered the reintroduction of EU import tariffs. Substantial reductions were 
seen in international rice prices, the benchmark Thai export grade falling by 
21% to a 7-month low, as buyers hesitated to enter a declining market (Interna-
tional Grains Council, 2008). 
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Figure 2.9 Export prices for wheat, maize and rice, July-October 2008 
 
Source: International Grains Council (2008). 
 
 The FAO (2008c) estimates that world grain trade will fall by 7 million (m) 
tonnes to 231m in 2009. A fall of 17m tonnes in EU imports will only be partly 
offset by increases in exports in Near East Asia and Pacific Asia. Among ex-
porters, USA sales are expected to show the largest decline. End-season stocks 
in the five major export countries are now projected to rise to 44m tonnes 
compared with only 29m in 2007/08 (the biggest rise is in the EU). However, 
world stocks are expected to decline to a 5-year low by the end of 2008/09. 
Futures indicate a slight increase in prices (figure 2.10), although these may be 
subject to change. 
 
Figure 2.10 Index price for futures for maize, wheat and rice  
December 2008 – 2011 a) 
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Figure 2.10 Index price for futures for maize, wheat and rice  
December 2008 – 2011 a) (continued) 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
de
c-0
8
jan
-09
feb
-09
mr
t-0
9
ap
r-0
9
me
i-0
9
jun
-09
jul-
09
au
g-0
9
se
p-0
9
ok
t-0
9
no
v-0
9
de
c-0
9
Ce
nt
s/
cw
t
Rough rice  
a) In cents per hundredweight (cwt) (100 pounds (equivalent to 45.4 kg). 
Source: Figure calculated from data of CBOT (2008). Available at tinyurl.com/ckgudh. 
 
 Despite these recent price falls, a study on changes in agricultural world 
market prices concludes that the mega-trend of declining world market prices 
has ended, although fluctuations above and below the trend will continue to ex-
ist, and are likely to be stronger in the future than they have been in the past 
(Witzke et al., 2008). In fact, volatility1 of grain prices has been increasing since 
the 1980s (figure 2.11). Higher price variability means higher costs for manag-
ing farm risks (higher option premiums, higher margins on futures contracts, 
wider futures-cash price bases, and higher premiums for crop revenue insur-
ance). Prices will need to increase to compensate farmers for these higher 
costs. In addition, processors of crops will need to widen their margins to cover 
the higher price risk of crop inputs. These impacts of higher price risk will trans-
late into higher food prices for consumers (Zulauf and Roberts, 2008). 
 
                                                 
1 Volatility is the measurement of change in price over a given period. It is often expressed as a per-
centage and computed as the annualised standard deviation of the percentage change in daily price. 
Linear denotes the trendline. 
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Figure 2.11 Volatility of maize, wheat and rice, 1980-2008 
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Source: CBOT (2008). 
 
 Figure 2.11 shows an increase in volatility based on historical data. How-
ever, most experts believe that volatility will continue to play a role in commod-
ity markets (Jodock, 2009). This may lead to tighter risk management of 
farmers as well as other actors in the chain such as grain elevators. The rea-
sons behind the expected volatility are not clear. However, the same reasons 
that were put forward for the price increase in 2007/08 may play a role in ex-
plaining price volatility: demand continues to increase, while supply is slowing 
somewhat (figures 2.12-2.13). More importantly, stocks are still very low, so if 
due to some factor, for instance failed harvest, supply suddenly decreases while 
demand remains the same, prices will peak again. 
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Figure 2.12 Projected increase in world crop demand 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
Wheat Corn Barley Rice
m
ill
io
n 
to
nn
es
2006 2015  
Source: Witzke et al. (2008) and FAPRI (2008). 
 
Figure 2.13 Projected production, trade and stocks of maize, wheat and 
rice, 2000-2018 
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Figure 2.13 Projected production, trade and stocks of maize, wheat and 
rice, 2000-2018 (continued) 
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Source: FAPRI (2008). 
 
 The impacts of the financial crisis that hit the world markets in October 
2008 will be felt in developing countries at the macro-level, with potentially 
negative effects on the agriculture sector and on food security. Agricultural 
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markets will be affected on both the demand and supply sides. In general, the 
slowing down of economic growth will negatively affect international demand for 
commodities - especially raw materials and livestock products - with such im-
pacts likely to be more limited for staple crops such as grains (FAO, 2008b). 
 Financial analyst Bloomberg1 expects that the credit crunch will lead to a 
profit squeeze for farmers that may reduce global harvests and worsen a food 
crisis for developing countries. The main reason is that farmers are having diffi-
culties in obtaining credit from banks to purchase fertiliser and other inputs. For 
instance, in Brazil, the world's third-biggest exporter of maize after the USA and 
Argentina, production may fall more than 20% because farmers are unable to 
obtain loans to buy fertiliser (Enori Barbieri, vice president of the Brazil National 
Maize Producers Association cited by Bloomberg). 
 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter described the various factors that underlie the agricultural com-
modity price increases of 2006-2008 and the price drop that started at the end 
of 2008. There are long-term as well as short-term factors in supply and de-
mand. A major factor has been the decrease in global grain stocks The world 
market for grains is very sensitive to supply and demand shifts: prices will react 
quickly to any change. Other short-term factors that contributed to the peak in-
cluded expansion of biofuel production facilitated by government policies, higher 
livestock feed requirements, dollar devaluation, rising farm production costs (in-
creasing fuel and fertiliser costs) and reduced supply through failed harvests. A 
new factor is the financial crisis which has hit the world since the 'credit crunch' 
of October 2008, when banks started failing and lending froze. It seems that 
this will have an impact on farmers who face difficulties in obtaining credit both 
from banks and agribusiness. 
 Whether prices will continue to fall as they have done in the last months of 
2008, or whether they will go back to their high levels of 2007/08 is unclear 
and depends on many factors. What seems to be clear, however, is that price 
volatility will continue to be an important factor in the future. Price ups and 
downs will follow each other more rapidly. 
 
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/6rfkds. 
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3 Increasing market concentration 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter starts with an explanation of what horizontal and vertical integration 
are and why firms would want to engage in such mergers. It then gives an over-
view of the main MNEs that operate in the international grains market, i.e. Car-
gill, ADM and Bunge. The chapter illustrates the increasing trend of horizontal 
and vertical integration with examples of large 'food clusters'. The chapter ends 
with some conclusions and the recommendation that more research is needed 
in this area. 
 
 
3.2 Background: horizontal and vertical integration 
 
We can distinguish horizontal integration and vertical integration. Both are im-
portant in increasing market concentration. The acquisition of additional busi-
ness activities at the same level of the value chain is referred to as horizontal 
integration. This form of expansion contrasts with vertical integration, which is 
when firms expand into upstream or downstream activities. There are several 
reasons why MNEs are involved in horizontal and vertical integration (see for in-
stance Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Horizontal integration offers the following 
advantages: 
- Economies of scale (for instance through selling more of the same product, 
for example by geographic expansion); 
- Economies of scope (for instance through sharing resources common to dif-
ferent products. Commonly referred to as 'synergies'); 
- Increased market power (over suppliers and downstream channel members); 
- Reduction in the cost of international trade by operating factories in foreign 
markets. 
 
 Vertical integration potentially offers the following advantages: 
- Improved supply chain coordination; 
- Better protection of investments; 
- Reduced need for strong performance incentives; 
- Avoiding monopoly distortions; 
- Capturing upstream or downstream profit margins; 
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- Increase entry barriers to potential competitors, for example, if the firm can 
gain sole access to a scarce resource; 
- Gain access to downstream distribution channels that otherwise would be 
inaccessible. 
 
 Levin (2001) adds another point related to price fluctuations, profits and 
competition, which is relevant for our study. In a year with bountiful harvest, 
processors, i.e. buyers are in a favourable position because there is much 
product on offer for low prices. However, a year with a shortfall in harvests, for 
instance due to drought, will lead to competition among buyers, higher prices 
for farm products and possibly lower profits for buyers. The input suppliers, on 
the other hand, will now be in a favourable position because high output prices 
will lead to more demand for inputs. According to Levin:  
 
 'Sooner or later, the largest most powerful economic interests in the proc-
essing sector will face the largest, most powerful interests among the (input) 
suppliers. What is of best interest to the one will not be of best interest to 
the other, and vice versa'.  
 
 Instead of engaging in a 'nasty and unproductive war' between the two 
sides, they agree to collaborate in a vertical integration structure. 
 Information on the degree of market concentration often lacks and no sys-
tematic approach exists to deal with the different stages of the commodity 
chain. This is also the case for the grain sector. The following section is an at-
tempt to explore emerging patterns in the grain sector. However, more in depth 
research on this topic is required. 
 
 
3.3 Overview of the main MNEs operating in international grain trade 
 
International grain trade varies between 7 and 18% of world grain production 
(table 3.1). Although this is a small share of the total production, trade is still 
significant considering the volumes involved (255m tonnes in 2008; FAO, 
2008c). 
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Table 3.1 International trade in grains as share of global production 
(2008) 
Grain International trade as share of production 
Rice 7% 
Maize 10% 
Barley 13% 
Wheat 18% 
Coarse grains 10% 
Source: USDA (2008). 
 
 The global grains trade is handled increasingly by only a handful of compa-
nies. Few (public) sources are available that reveal details about this market 
concentration. One interesting source is the research at the University of Mis-
souri. Heffernan et al. (1999 and 2002) and Hendrickson and Heffernan (2005) 
have tracked changes in markets for major agricultural commodities since the 
mid-1980s. This research shows that almost all the grain that moves between 
nations, passes through Cargill, ADM, or Bunge. 
 
3.3.1 Cargill1 
 
Cargill is an international provider of food, agricultural and risk management 
products and services. Its headquarters are in Minnesota, USA. It has 75 busi-
nesses organised around five major segments: agriculture services, food ingre-
dients and applications, origination and processing, risk management and 
financial, and industrial. Cargill is also involved in 29 joint ventures. 
 The grain & oilseed supply chain employs 15,000 people in 50 countries 
(figure 3.1). They operate 324 interior silos, 31 import/export elevators, 54 
crush plants in 17 countries and 137,000ha of palm oil plantations in Indonesia 
and Papua New Guinea. The grain & oilseed supply chain consists of 13 busi-
ness units that operate on an integrated global basis. They source, trade, proc-
ess and distribute grain and oilseeds. The main bulk products handled are 
wheat, maize, oilseeds, barley and sorghum, as well as vegetable oils and 
meals. Because they charter more than 150m tonnes of dry bulk tonnage, they 
have the logistical flexibility and opportunity to leverage efficiencies in the supply 
                                                 
1 This information was compiled from Cargill's 2008 annual report and its website at 
www.cargill.com. 
 41 
chain. The grain & oilseed supply chain also includes ocean freight and logistics 
business. It coordinates all of Cargill's ocean bulk freight needs and a growing 
volume of other companies' coal and mineral freights. 
 Cargill offers financial and hedging products to the products and services of 
the grain & oilseed supply chain by close cooperation with its trade and struc-
tured finance business unit, and the company's risk management teams add a 
further range of financial and hedging products to the products and services of-
fered through their grain & oilseed supply chain. 
 Its industrial segment includes The Mosaic Company, in which Cargill is the 
major investor. It mines, manufactures, markets and distributes fertiliser around 
the world. Mosaic is one of the world's leading producers and marketers of 
concentrated phosphate and potash crop nutrients. 
 
Figure 3.1 Cargill's global presence 
 
Source: Cargill (2008) (www.cargill.com/worldwide). 
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3.3.2 ADM1 
 
Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) is one of the largest commercial agri-
businesses in the world. ADM has its headquarters in Decatur, USA. It proc-
esses grains and oilseeds and deals with the storage and transportation of 
commodities. ADM's products are used agriculturally for human consumers and 
livestock, as well as in the fuel industry. ADM has become an increasingly inter-
national business, with a large presence in Brazil and China (figure 3.2). The 
company employs 27,600 people in 58 countries on 6 continents at more than 
320 sourcing facilities and more than 230 processing plants, interconnected by 
2,100 trailers, 2,200 barges and 23,800 railcars. ADM is involved in various 
business segments: oilseeds processing, corn processing (including biofuels), 
other food and feed ingredients and agricultural services. 
 With respect to corn processing, ADM operates both wet and dry mills for 
the production of various products that are sold to the food and beverage in-
dustry. It also sells various products that are used by the pork and poultry in-
dustry. 
 ADM produces biodiesel in Brazil and is looking into renewable energy in the 
form of ethanol. ADM currently holds partial ownership of the Brazilian company 
Cosan SA and there is speculation of larger buyouts. This would allow ADM to 
enter the sugar-cane ethanol market. 
 ADM's agricultural services' segment makes use of the company's elevators 
and transportation network to transport, store, buy, and clean commodities 
such as oilseeds, maize, wheat, milo, oats, and barley, and then resell these to 
the agricultural processing industry. This in turn provides reliable services to its 
own processing operation. ADM is involved in various other operations including: 
milling wheat, maize, and milo into flour; producing wheat starch, gluten, and 
lecithin. 
 During the past five years, ADM has experienced significant growth, spend-
ing approximately USD5.3b. for construction of new plants, maintenance and 
expansions of existing plants, and the acquisitions of plants and transportation 
equipment. 
 
                                                 
1 This information was compiled from ADM's 2008 annual report and its website at www.adm.com. 
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Figure 3.2 ADM's global presence 
 
Source: ADM Annual Report (2008). 
 
3.3.3 Bunge1 
 
Bunge is a world leader in the agribusiness and food industry. It has its head-
quarters in Bermuda. The company employs nearly 24,000 employees and is 
active in North and South America, Europe and Asia, with international market-
ing and sales offices around the world (figure 3.3). Bunge's main focus is soy-
beans, but it also handles, processes and sells rapeseed, sun seed, maize, 
wheat and other crops. 
 Operations are segmented into four major divisions: agribusiness, fertiliser, 
edible oil products, and milling products. Edible oil and milling products are 
grouped together into a collective 'food products' category. While fertiliser ac-
counts for 10% of revenue, it is an important sector for Bunge. 
 
                                                 
1 This information was compiled from Bunge's 2008 annual report and its website at 
www.bunge.com. 
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Figure 3.3 Bunge's global presence 
 
Source: tinyurl.com/cn3bj8. 
 
 The agribusiness sector involves the purchase, storage, transport, process-
ing, and sale of agricultural commodities and products. This sector works pri-
marily with grains and oilseeds but also includes sugar (mainly exported from 
Brazil) and biofuels (mostly biodiesel and maize-based ethanol). Bunge markets 
its grains and oilseed products to feed manufacturers, wheat/maize millers, 
other oilseed processors, livestock, poultry, and aquaculture producers, edible 
oil processing companies (including its own food division), and biofuel custom-
ers, all of which operate among approximately 80 countries. Bunge also works 
with farmers (mainly in Brazil) as a financier, chiefly with prepaid commodity pur-
chase contracts. 
 Bunge is currently the largest supplier of fertiliser to South America. In Brazil 
it is involved in every stage of the process, from mining to marketing. It also 
controls 26% of the Brazilian nitrogen, phosphate and potassium fertiliser retail 
market. This foothold in Brazil allows the company to greatly cut-down on trans-
portation expenses to South America. 
 The food products sector is divided into edible oil products and milling prod-
ucts. The company has refining and packaging facilities in North America, South 
America, Europe, and Asia. Its milling products sector provides wheat flours 
chiefly to Brazil and maize products such as maize grits, meal and flour, maize 
meal, and maize-soy blend to North America, used both for human and animal 
consumption. 
 45 
 According to Bunge, integration enables it to supply global needs efficiently 
and create value in a variety of market conditions. Its decentralised structure 
enables it to stay close to local markets, where it can react quickly to customer 
needs. 
 In the agribusiness Bunge is expanding its network of oilseed processing 
and storage assets. In 2007, it purchased a majority interest in a soybean 
processing plant in the Chinese city of Tianjin, and continued to enhance facili-
ties in North America. Recently, Bunge announced the planned construction of a 
new plant in Brazil. It agreed to acquire Maize Products International in June 
2008. 
 
 
3.4 Food clusters 
 
An important trend in the international grain sector, which also applies to the 
overall food sector, is greater concentration at several stages of the supply 
chain from the agricultural input sector up to the agricultural retailing. The UN 
body UNCTAD (2006) has carried out a broad inventory of this trend in re-
sponse to shared observations that: 
 
'the added value retained by many developing countries' producers of 
commodities is decreasing in some sectors, and their participation in 
domestic and international value chains is a major challenge. This situa-
tion may be further complicated by concentrated market structures at 
the international and national level' (São Paulo consensus para 64)1 
 
And:  
 
'[…] rather than diversification of commodity patterns of trade, in several 
countries concentration has increased over the past decade; only a few 
countries have made tangible progress in diversification, primarily based 
on agro-business' (UNCTAD XI Bangkok Plan of Action).2 
 
 UNCTAD observes a trend towards greater concentration at several stages 
in various commodity sectors. In the agricultural input sector there has been a 
                                                 
1 Cited in UNCTAD 2006. 
2 Cited in UNCTAD 2006. 
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host of divestitures, mergers and acquisitions leading to a few major integrated 
companies, each controlling proprietary lines of agricultural chemicals, seeds, 
and biotech traits. There has been a significant increase in the concentration of 
the input industries (tables 3.2 to 3.4), especially in recent years. 
 
Table 3.2 Top 10 agrochemical companies, ranking by sales, 2004 
Company  Agrochemical Sales 2007 
(USD millions) 
Market Share 
(percent)  
1. Bayer  7,458 19 
2. Syngenta  7,285 18 
3. BASF  4,297 11 
4. Dow AgroSciences 3,779 10 
5. Monsanto  3,599 9 
6. DuPont  2,369 6 
7. Makhteshim Agan 1,895 5 
8. Nufarm 1,470 4 
9. Sumitomo Chenicam 1,209 3 
10. Arysta Lifescience 1,035 3 
Total 34,396 89 
Source: ETC (2008). 
 
Table 3.3 Top 10 seed companies 
Company 2007 seed sales 
(USD millions) 
% of global proprie-
tary seed market 
1. Monsanto (US)   4,964  23  
2. DuPont (US)   3,300  15  
3. Syngenta (Switzerland)   2,018  9  
4. Groupe Limagrain (France)   1,226  6  
5. Land O' Lakes (US)   917  4  
6. KWS AG (Germany)   702  3  
7. Bayer Crop Science (Germany)   524  2  
8. Sakata (Japan)   396  <2  
9. DLF Trifolium (Denmark)  391  <2  
10. Takii (Japan)   347  <2  
Top 10 Total   14,785  67 
Source: ETC (2008). 
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Table 3.4 Top 10 fertiliser companies 
Company 2007 Net Income 
PotashCorp 1,104 
Yara 4,027 
Mosaic (Cargill has 55% stake) 944 
Israel Cheinals Ltd 461 
Agrium 441 
K+S Group 303 
Sociedad Quimca y Minera 165 
Total 7,445 
Source: ETC (2008). 
 
 Levin (2001) points out that market concentration does not always result in 
higher prices or greater profits. Profit alone, however measured, is an incom-
plete measure of power. Economies of scale may, for instance, be passed on to 
consumers in order to capture larger market shares. Power can also be more a 
reflection of size than monopoly. Size confers market power through acquisi-
tion, leading to logistical control, economies of scale, barriers to entry of com-
petitors, et cetera. 
 Besides horizontal integration through mergers and acquisitions UNCTAD 
(2006) identifies a trend towards increased 'coordination', which typically refers 
to contractual arrangements, alliances and tacit collusive practices. At the hori-
zontal level, UNCTAD finds a trend towards heightened strategic cooperation 
among the largest competitors in the agricultural biotechnology sector, but also 
vertical coordination upwards and downwards along the food chain, with the es-
tablishment of 'food clusters' that combine agricultural inputs (agrochemicals, 
seeds and traits) with extensive handling, processing and marketing facilities. 
 In 1999, Heffernan et al. (1999) have identified three such clusters: Cargill/ 
Monsanto, ConAgra, and Novartis (now Syngenta)/ADM (figures 3.4 and 3.5 for 
the situation in 1999 for examples of food clusters with Cargill and ADM) al-
though these clusters have changed since then.1 We have reprinted the 1999 
                                                 
1 The Novartis/ADM cluster has undergone significant changes with ADM buying Farmland's grain op-
erations, Novartis combining seed and chemical operations with AstraZeneca and becoming Syn-
genta, and IBP ceasing to exist as a stand-alone company. Cargill has developed joint ventures with 
Dow and Hormel while restructuring itself to become more than a commodity trader. Other firms, 
such as Bunge, Tyson, and Smithfield, are positioned to form other food chain clusters (Hendricksen 
and Heffernan, 2005). 
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figures in this report to illustrate what these complex clusters look like. Unfortu-
nately, there is very little new material. ETC (2008) has provided some sample 
alliances between agribusiness and big oil, synbiotech and chemicals. UNCTAD 
(2006) has also identified three 'food clusters': (i) Cargill/Monsanto Joint Ven-
tures and Strategic Alliances; (ii) Novartis (now Syngenta)/ADM; (iii) DuPont/ 
ConAgra, but details are missing. 
 The logic behind these large 'food clusters' is clear, however. The agricul-
tural input companies need the grain handlers' extensive handling and process-
ing facilities to guarantee a downstream market to producers using their 
(genetically modified) seed stock. By strengthening cooperation with upstream 
partners, grain traders enhance their access both to farmers and raw materials. 
 Hendricksen and Heffernan (2005), in an update on their 1999 analysis,1 de-
scribe that while changes still take place, a new structure in food and agricul-
ture is emerging. Although the clusters in figures 3.4 and 3.5 have changed, 
integrated clusters now dominate agriculture and food production around the 
world. Hendrickson and Heffernan (2005:22) conclude that: 
 
'One of the most important issues raised by the globalizing structure of 
the food system is who makes the decisions about what is produced and 
consumed and on what basis these decisions are made. The structure 
briefly described (…) means that decisions about who produces our food, 
what food is produced, how it is produced, and who gets to eat that food 
have been steadily moving from the more public realm of debate and dia-
logue to the more private realm of corporate boardrooms. As the struc-
ture of the marketplace has changed for farmers, the decisions they can 
make about what plants and animals to use in their farming operations 
have been severely constrained. The vast amount of food grown on to-
day's farms is already destined to move inexorably through one of the 
food chain clusters that we have documented. In addition, consumers 
who rely on major supermarkets, chain restaurants, or institutional food 
services to supply their food needs face more limited choices, a counter-
                                                 
1 However, Heffernan has stated in 1999 that 'When we began collecting the data in the mid-1980s, 
this information was relatively easy to obtain in trade journals, government reports, annual reports 
from corporations and other secondary sources. Over time, this information has become more diffi-
cult to obtain. Trade journals have come under pressure not to publish some of this information and 
government agencies often say that to reveal the proportion of a market controlled by a single firm in 
such a concentrated market is revealing proprietary information.' This is probably why we have been 
unable to find updated versions of figures 3.4 to 3.6. 
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intuitive argument given the vast array of produce available in supermar-
kets.' 
 
Figure 3.4 Cargill/Monsanto cluster in 1999 
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Figure 3.5 Novartis-ADM1 cluster in 1999 
 
Source: Heffernan et al. (1999). 
 
 
                                                 
1 Novartis is now Syngenta. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
World grain trade constitutes only a small share of world production (from 7% 
for rice to 18% for wheat). The global trade is handled increasingly by a handful 
of companies. Cargill, ADM and Bunge are the major players. In the grains mar-
ket (and food markets in general) there is a continuing trend towards horizontal 
and vertical integration. An important reason for firms to engage in such merg-
ers is reduced competition in global food markets. Large MNEs such as Cargill, 
ADM and Bunge engage in various collaborative contracts with large MNEs that 
specialise in inputs (such as agrochemicals and seeds). Such 'food clusters' 
wield much power in terms of decisions about what is produced, what is con-
sumed and on what basis these decision are made. 
 Although such food clusters are increasing in importance, there is relatively 
little recent data on them. We therefore recommend two areas of further re-
search. First, more detailed research on how the responsibilities and roles are 
divided between countries, i.e. governments, and MNEs. It is unclear how deci-
sions are made on issues such as what quantities are exported to which coun-
tries or imported from which country. What role do domestic policies (export 
tariffs, et cetera) or international policies play - for instance when food clusters 
span the whole globe, what is the role of the WTO? 
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4 Supply chain linkages 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter we examine the organisation of the global grain supply chain. We 
then explore the organisation of the African grain supply chain and how interna-
tional grain markets are linked to domestic African grain markets. We examine 
briefly the role of the large MNEs in grain markets in Africa, which, as we will 
see, is limited. We conclude the chapter by analysing what effect the high inter-
national grain prices have had on farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
4.2 The global grain supply chain: a few large MNE and many farmers 
 
A noteworthy characteristic of the grains value chain is its length (Rabobank, 
2005). By the time a grain is turned into a final product, it has passed through 
many stages of collection, trading, processing and further processing. Al-
though, in fact, many different value chains exist under the grains umbrella, all 
of them share some common characteristics. First, as mentioned above, there 
is the length of the chain. Second, the scale required to perform in the first 
stages of the value chain (up to and including the first line of processing). Third, 
traders, wheat millers, and maize refiners are usually huge industries (with rela-
tively low margins) that operate in a consolidated environment. Finally, most 
firms in the supply chain are either present up to and including processing, or 
start from there and focus on the manufacturing of (branded) grain-based con-
sumer products.1 
 Although industrialisation has resulted in substantial increases in agricultural 
productivity over the last century, its effect has created downward pressures on 
farm prices even as input costs have increased consistent with inflationary 
                                                 
1 According to Burkhardt (1991:321) the historical analogies are clear: nearly every efficiency-
increasing innovation in technology over the past 100 years that has been introduced into agriculture 
and widely adopted by agricultural producers has contributed to the industrialisation and concentra-
tion of agricultural production. The predominant concern of the agricultural establishment (including 
farmers), as well as the implicit opinion of consumers, has been that increased productivity, yields, 
and cheap and available food are of key importance. From a cost-benefit point of view this will be 
best (or only) achieved by high-tech, large-scale agricultural operations, so that technologies favour-
ing this structure have been and probably will continue to be introduced into agriculture. 
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norms (Hendrickson and James, 2005). The downward pressure on prices re-
sulting from increased productivity causes what Cochrane already in 1958 iden-
tified as a 'technological treadmill'. Agricultural technology increases farm 
productivity, but this in turn lowers prices, thus reducing farmers' incomes, en-
forcing farmers to invest in productivity-increasing technology, et cetera. This 
applies to farmers in the developed and developing world. 
 As was described in chapter 3, current agricultural markets are character-
ised by both horizontal and vertical concentration. Only a few MNEs dominate 
the same stage of production (horizontal concentration) and these MNEs have 
united different products or services (vertical integration). There is now a situa-
tion in which a large number of competitive and relatively powerless suppliers 
face a few large powerful buyers (Vorley, 2003). Farmers are playing to the 
rules of perfect competition while their large MNE customers are part of a com-
plex monopoly. Levins (2001) points out that the competitiveness of farmers is 
the main cause of many problems: 
 
'Of all the economic sectors of our food system, farmers are universally 
regarded as being the most competitive among themselves. Such com-
petition, in a world of giants, works against farm income in many ways. 
For example, why do farmers rush to adopt technology that will benefit a 
few in the short run, but hurt everyone in the long run? Competition 
among themselves. Why do farmers constantly produce more than mar-
kets can reasonably be expected to take at reasonable prices? Competi-
tion among themselves. And why do farmers have such low economic 
power that they lose profits to landowners and agribusiness giants? 
Again, the answer is competition among themselves.' 
 
 This explains also why throughout the world, farmers' net incomes have 
been increasing only slightly (or even declining), while the profits of the large 
MNEs such as Cargill, Bunge and ADM have been increasing fairly rapidly. 
 According to Levins (ibid), ensuring that farmers receive higher prices no 
longer constitutes a real solution in today's world. Although higher prices will in-
troduce additional profits into the farming system, those new profits will eventu-
ally be claimed by sectors of the agricultural economy that have greater 
economic power than farmers. The problem is that farmers are unable to claim 
profits. One evident solution is that farmers should act collectively in their own 
economic interests and thereby gain economic power. For farmers in developed 
countries, where a strong farm lobby exists (but which may be offset by more 
powerful lobbies from large MNEs), this might be easier to achieve than in de-
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veloping countries. In developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
farmers are often those with least power, because they live far away from politi-
cal centres, because they have no economic power, because they lack informa-
tion, et cetera. Establishing cooperatives may help improve such problems. 
 
 
4.3 Sub-Saharan Africa: a different situation 
 
This study examines the influence of the world's largest MNEs on poor farmers 
in the grain sector and it chose therefore to focus on Africa. Most of Africa's 
farmers live on less than 1 dollar a day. 
 
4.3.1 Grain supply chain in SSA 
 
In many parts of Africa, trade in food crops such as grains is not (yet) domi-
nated by a few large firms such as in the developed countries and increasingly 
in Asia and Latin America. In Africa, the grains trade is characterised by a high 
level of fragmentation. Box 1 gives an example of maize trade in East Africa, 
which is illustrative for most of the food trade in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although 
several large agribusiness firms are active in Africa, their operations are usually 
limited to (export) crops such as tea, cocoa, coffee or cotton. These are well-
integrated chains, often involving plantations or a system in which smallholders 
sell directly to a major company. 
 Box 1 also shows that much of the cross-border food trade is unrecorded 
and thus does not show up in official export figures. Although free trade agree-
ments have made much headway around the world, this has often not been the 
case for many regions within Africa, where tariffs and non-tariff measures still 
apply between neighbouring countries. African countries might gain by opening 
their trade to neighbouring countries, which could help balance deficient and 
surplus areas and prevent local famines and stabilise prices. A study by CIRAD 
(Daviron, 2008) shows that when a country has closed its borders to grains 
trade, domestic grain prices will fluctuate much more compared to a situation of 
open borders. The reason for this is that when a country cannot balance its sur-
pluses and deficits through trade, and depends on domestic supply only, it is 
much more susceptible to fluctuations. When grain harvests fail, the lack of 
supply (with constant demand) will cause prices to increase. The study also 
shows that local grain varieties such as sorghum and millet have remained unaf-
fected by the international price peak because these crops are essentially non-
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tradables1 and only domestic and regional supply and demand dynamics deter-
mine their prices. 
 This is supported by a recent study on the likely impact of rising world food 
prices on the welfare and food security of Ugandan households (Benson et al., 
2008; IFPRI, 2008). It finds that the causes that led to the global rise in food 
prices do not apply strongly to Uganda. The transmission of prices for staple 
foods from the international market to Ugandan markets exists only for rice and, 
presumably, for wheat, both tradables. Food traders and market analysts sug-
gest that regional and local factors account for increases in Ugandan staple 
food prices. There are several reasons why the rise in global food prices have 
not affected Uganda's food prices much. The country is quite isolated from 
global food markets, and prices from those markets are not transmitted very ef-
fectively to Uganda (table 4.1: transport and transaction costs are very high for 
a landlocked country). Second, several of Uganda's key staples are not traded 
on international markets. Finally, regional demands, for instance from neighbour-
ing countries Kenya and Sudan, may have a greater impact on Ugandan grain 
prices than international prices. These issues are not only relevant for Uganda 
but for many other Sub-Saharan countries as well. 
 
Box 1 Cross-border trade in East Africa: high market fragmentation 
There are many small and medium scale traders (SMTs) involved in food trade in East Africa. 
The main actors in the cross-border trade in East Africa, including DRC, CAR, Malawi, and 
Zambia, are SMTs from all countries in the region. For example, it is believed that SMTs 
move at least 70,000m tonnes per year of cross-border maize between Kenya and Uganda, 
as well as considerable tonnages of beans and maize between Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, 
Kenya, and DRC using vehicles and backload capacity. The estimated tradable surplus of 
maize in Kenya is between 600,000 and 750,000m tonnes per year. Of the estimated cross 
border maize imports into Kenya of between 100,000 and 175,000m tonnes, 75-80% is un-
recorded trade by SMTs. Large private traders or processors rarely engage in cross-border 
trade because they are able to purchase their requirements through these SMTs. National 
strategic grain reserves do occasionally sell or purchase from each other. In 2004, Tanza-
nia's strategic grain reserves purchased 20,000m tonnes of maize from Kenya's National 
Grains and Produce Board (Awuor, 2007). 
 
                                                 
1 A tradable commodity is a commodity that is traded on the world market, for instance at the Chi-
cago Board of Trade. This means that it has an international price. 
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Figure 4.1 Cross-border maize trade flows in East Africa 
 
Source: Awuor (2007). 
 
 Although domestic grain prices in Africa seem to be relatively unaffected by 
international prices, farmers in Africa were confronted with much higher prices 
of inputs (i.e. fertilisers), which are almost all imported. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the use of those inputs is generally very low because the prices of these inputs 
are too high relative to the expected returns. Even higher fertiliser prices have 
led to lower use, thus reducing yields (Jayne et al., 2008). 
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4.3.2 Presence of MNEs in Africa1 
 
Although Cargill, Bunge, ADM and other MNEs do have a presence in Africa, it is 
limited to traditional cash-crops such as cocoa. These MNEs have only limited 
operations in Africa in the grain sector. 
 ADM crushes and exports cocoa and shea nuts in West Africa (Cameroon, 
Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana). ADM is a world leader in cocoa processing, and West 
Africa produces 70% of the world's cocoa beans. Bunge is active in Northern 
Africa, which is a destination market for soybean meal, wheat and maize but 
Bunge does not import grains from North Africa. Cargill is present in various  
African countries: Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Malawi, Zambia, Morocco, and Zimbabwe. In West Africa Cargill is involved in 
cacao, in Kenya in tea and in Tanzania, Zimbabwe and South Africa in cotton. 
Cargill is involved on a small scale in grain in Morocco and South Africa. It is 
clear that the major MNEs have a limited presence in grains in Africa2, at least 
compared to other continents. 
 There are various signs that large agribusiness firms are increasing their 
scale of operation in Asia. In its financial report of October 2008, Bunge reports 
that it has purchased a 50% stake in the port of Phu My in Vietnam. Since 2004, 
Bunge has had exclusive rights to ship agricultural commodities through the 
port. Now that it is a part owner of the port, Bunge can expand the port's ca-
pacity and accelerate the growth of its business in the market (Bunge, 2008).  
 Vorley (2003) discerns an increasing role of transactional agribusiness in the 
rice market in Asia. UNCTAD's rice commodity information3 shows that for a 
long period of time, rice trading was exclusively a government affair (public con-
tracts) and/or a family business, but that the importance of private exporters 
has grown. In Thailand, for example, private trading exportation has risen over 
the past ten years from 20% to 80%. In Vietnam, private negotiators have also 
appeared increasingly, following national economic reforms that took place in 
the 1990s. The main Asiatic parastatals - which used to be in charge of interna-
tional trade - still manage large exportable stocks but they now usually sell 
through private exporters. These exporters are in direct contact with private im-
                                                 
1 In recent years, MNEs from Asia and the Arab States have been involved in large-scale land leases 
in Africa such as Madagascar, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Sudan. The land leased by these MNEs is 
used to grow food crops such as maize or oilcrops such as palmoil for domestic consumption. These 
land leases, however, were not part of this study. 
2 It should be noted that the presence of MNEs in Africa is much greater for inputs such as fertilisers. 
3 Available on the internet at tinyurl.com/bfk4td. Accessed February 2009. 
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porters from Europe, the Middle East and Africa. The liberalisation and com-
mercialization of production chains as well as the end of cereal import state 
monopolies have allowed for this transition to take place. It is therefore now 
easier for large MNEs to get a foothold in these countries. 
 
4.3.3 Impact of high prices on farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
This section briefly examines the question whether the high grain market prices 
benefited farmers in SSA. We conclude that this has not been the case for the 
majority of farmers, for several reasons. First, we examine whether high prices 
led to a supply response: did farmers in Africa start growing more grains be-
cause they could receive higher prices? The data does not seem to indicate this. 
 
Figure 4.2 Grain production in Africa 2006-2008 (in million tonnes) 
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Source: FAO (2008a). 
 
 In the period 2006-2008, the production of grains has not increased much 
in Africa (figure 4.2). This seems to indicate that the supply response to prices 
has been very low, which again is an indication of various factors that impede 
farmers in Africa to increase production. One major factor has been the in-
crease in fertiliser prices, which has outpaced the price increase of grains. As 
fertiliser prices rose, farmers decreased fertiliser use (Jayne et al., 2008). An-
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other factor has been various weather conditions such as drought in several 
countries which have led to crop failure. 
 Secondly, price transmission - the extent to which world market prices are 
transmitted to farmers - is not high in Africa. There are various reasons for this. 
The most important reasons are that traders in Africa face high transport and 
transaction costs, which increase the margins between the price that farmers 
get and the price consumers have to pay (table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1 High transport and transaction costs in Africa 
Region Trading time 
across borders 
for exports 
(days) 
Average trans-
port costs (USD 
per container 
to Baltimore) 
Population in 
landlocked 
countries (%) 
Road density 
(km2 of road 
per surface 
area (1999) 
East Asia &  
Pacific 
24 3,900 0.42 0.72 
Europe &  
Central Asia 
29 n.a. 23.00 n.a. 
Latin America & 
Caribbean  
22 4,600 2.77 0.12 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
27 2,100 0.00 0.33 
South Asia 34 3,900 3.78 0.85 
Sub-Saharan  
Africa 
40 7,600 40.20 0.13 
Source: WorldBank (2008). 
 
 Trading time across orders in Africa is much higher than in any other conti-
nent. Average transport costs are also much higher, due to the fact that many 
countries are landlocked and goods need to be transported over land before 
they can be loaded on a cargo ship. Road density is also low in Africa. These 
high transport and transaction costs may be one reason why large MNEs such 
as Cargill, Bunge and ADM are not (yet) interested to source their grains from 
Africa. 
 Third, only farmers who are net sellers can increase their income when out-
put prices rise (and input prices remain the same). However, many of Africa's 
farmers are net buyers. A study on the likely impact of rising world food prices 
on the welfare and food security of Ugandan households by IFPRI (2008) exam-
ined whether farmers benefited from high (grain) prices. It shows that a rela-
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tively small segment of Ugandan households might have benefited directly from 
rising food prices - the net sellers of food crops, which constitute only between 
12% and 27% of the population. Therefore, the study concludes that for broad 
economic growth and poverty reduction, consideration must be paid to how the 
increased income these relatively few households realise from higher food 
prices is invested privately to result in significant economic growth in their 
communities and the nation as a whole. 
 Finally, many of SSA's grains are non-tradables such as millet, sorghum etc 
(section 4.3.1) which are relatively unaffected by international market prices for 
tradable grains, but depend on domestic supply and demand dynamics. 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
While the global grain trade is increasingly characterised by horizontal and ver-
tical integration, which has been facilitated by trade liberalisation, producers all 
over the world face increasing competition. Technology has increased agricul-
tural productivity, but has also depressed prices (by increasing supply). Farmers 
in developed as well as developing countries find themselves in a 'technological 
treadmill'. A large number of competitive and relatively powerless producers 
face a few large powerful buyers. These factors explain why throughout the 
world, net incomes of producers have not increased much or have even de-
creased. Farmers might counter this situation by organising themselves and 
protecting their interests. 
 In Sub-Saharan Africa, the situation is somewhat different because the large 
MNEs are hardly active in the grain sector. Most African grain markets are 
characterised by high fragmentation: trade is carried out by a multitude of small 
traders. Domestic grain markets are highly influenced by domestic and regional 
supply and demand factors rather than international factors. A failed harvest in 
one region, for instance, pushes up prices in that region, as well as neighbour-
ing regions. Many grains produced and traded in Africa are non-tradable (such 
as sorghum, millet), which means there is no international market for them. 
Transaction and transport costs are relatively high in Africa, which leads to low 
price transmission, i.e. high international prices are not translated to high local 
prices or with a substantial lag. Although international grain prices have a limited 
effect on African domestic markets, the high fertiliser prices in the international 
market did have a significant effect on local fertiliser prices, which increased 
considerably. Many farmers in Africa are net buyers of food, and thus they will 
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not benefit from higher grain prices, while they are hurt by higher fertiliser 
prices. 
 The study shows that the MNEs are not active in Africa, which might be due 
to the high transaction and transport costs that exist in the agricultural sector. 
However, it might be worthwhile to get a better picture of the plans of MNEs 
with respect to Africa. A recent trend in Africa has been the lease of huge areas 
of agricultural land to countries and companies from the Middle East and Asia. 
Although this was not part of our study, it does show the interest in large and 
powerful players in the African agricultural sector, i.e. land. It might also be 
worthwhile to execute a similar study of the role of the three large MNEs in 
Asian grain trade, where they appear to be much more active. 
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5 Influence of speculation and MNEs on 
price setting 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the role of MNE and speculation on grain prices. It first 
gives some background information on speculation and financial markets. It then 
examines what evidence or arguments there are for speculation leading to 
higher prices. In section 5.2 the role of MNEs on prices is examined by analys-
ing the financial results of Bunge, ADM and Cargill. It attempts to determine how 
MNEs are able to generate such high profits in times of high prices. Section 5.3 
concludes. 
 
 
5.2 Role of financial markets and speculation 
 
5.2.1 Background: what is speculation? 
 
Speculation consists essentially of making investments in anticipation of a price 
increase or decrease. Speculation is often (mis)understood to always lead to 
higher prices and ultimately lead to a 'bubble', where prices no longer reflect 
their intrinsic 'real' value. Speculation is also (mis)understood as purely a form 
of gambling. Both beliefs are untrue in most cases. 
 First, speculation and the presence of speculative traders are a normal fea-
ture of many markets. Speculation plays a price discovery role and can thus 
lead to more efficient markets, i.e. markets that readjust quickly to a new situa-
tion of scarcity or plenty. Second, speculators usually make informed decisions. 
Finally, many speculative investors will use a hedging strategy in combination 
with their speculative investment in order to limit potential losses. As a result of 
this, investments that anticipate higher prices will be combined with investments 
that anticipate lower prices. 
 However, in some cases, speculation does cause prices to deviate from 
their intrinsic value. This is the case if speculators trade on misinformation, or 
wrong expectations (believing prices will continue to rise/decrease in the fu-
ture). For example, speculative purchasing can push prices above their true 
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value simply because the speculative purchasing artificially increases the de-
mand. 
 In this section we therefore do not analyse the existence of speculation, be-
cause there is always speculative buying and selling presence in grain markets, 
but our aim is to investigate whether speculative buying has been one of the 
causes of high grain prices in 2008. 
 
5.2.2 Overview of financial and futures markets 
 
Agricultural futures markets - where specific quantities of a commodity or finan-
cial instruments are bought and sold at a specified price with delivery set at a 
specified time in the future - experienced rapid growth starting in late 2004. The 
open interest (or total amount of contracts) for many agricultural futures mar-
kets doubled or even tripled from late 2004 through 2006. For example, figure 
5.1 shows that open interest for Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) for wheat in-
creased significantly. The increase in open interest may be attributed to elec-
tronic trading and easier market access, an inflationary environment for many 
commodity markets, and, potentially, an increase in the use of commodity fu-
tures as an investment tool and inflation hedge (Sanders et al., 2008). Figure 
5.1 shows that there was a significant increase in trade by non-commercial 
traders, large speculators who do not actually trade in a commodity but only 
speculate that prices will increase or decrease. Usually, hedging contracts are 
balanced by speculative contracts. Also trading by commercial traders in-
creased. These traders actually provide a commodity such as wheat to the 
market or have bought a contract to take delivery of it. They trade in the futures 
market to hedge against price fluctuations. The trade by non-reporting (small 
speculators) remained the same. 
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Figure 5.1 Combined futures and options open interest (total trade) 
for Chicago Board of Trade for wheat, 1995-2008 
 
Source: Sanders et al. (2008). 
 
5.2.3 Speculation as a root cause of high prices? 
 
The impact of speculators on commodity prices has been hotly debated in the 
popular press and political circles. A number of bills have been introduced in the 
USA Congress with the purpose of prohibiting or limiting index fund speculation 
in commodity futures and 'over the counter' (OTC)1 derivative markets. Propo-
nents of the speculative theory claim that the speculative positions created a 
'bubble,' where market prices far exceed fundamental values. It is interesting to 
note that most claims are not based on real evidence or convincing arguments. 
The mere fact that there has been an increase in speculative investments in re-
cent years seems to be sufficient evidence that speculation has increased 
prices. However, there are various arguments against the speculative theory 
(Irwin, 2008):  
1. For every speculative long position, there is a short position, or in other 
words: 'For everyone who thinks the price is going up there is someone 
                                                 
1 Over-the-counter (OTC) trading is trade of financial instruments such as stocks, bonds, commodities 
or derivatives directly between two parties. It is contrasted with exchange trading, which occurs via 
facilities constructed for the purpose of trading, i.e. exchanges, such as futures exchanges or stock 
exchanges. 
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who thinks it is going down, and for everyone who trades with the flow of 
the market, there is someone trading against it.' If speculation is driving 
prices above fundamental values, it is not obvious in the level of speculation 
relative to hedging. In most markets, the increase in (long) speculative posi-
tions was equalled or surpassed by an increase in (short) hedging1; 
2. Recent price increases do not neatly fit a bubble explanation. Price in-
creases are concentrated in the grain and oilseed markets. Yet, the highest 
concentration of long-only speculative positions has been in the livestock fu-
tures markets. Very high prices have also been observed for commodities 
without futures markets, such as durum wheat and edible beans, and in ag-
ricultural futures markets that are not included in popular commodity indi-
ces such as rice and fluid milk; 
3. If speculators create a bubble in futures prices for storable commodities, 
this also creates an incentive to store commodities because prices in the 
future exceed levels normally required to compensate inventory holders for 
storage. There should therefore be an increase in inventories when a bub-
ble is present. In fact, inventories for grains and oilseeds have fallen sharply 
over the last two years (figure 2.1); 
4. A very large number of futures and derivative contracts can be created at a 
given price level. In theory, there is no limit. This is another way of saying 
that flows of money, no matter how large, do not necessarily affect the fu-
tures price of a commodity at a given point in time. Simply observing that 
large investment has flowed into the long side of commodity futures mar-
kets at the same time that prices have risen substantially does not neces-
sarily prove a causal effect between speculation and prices. 
 
 Two in-depth analyses have been executed, both of which conclude there is 
not enough evidence to support the claim that speculative investments have led 
to higher prices in the commodity markets. The first study (Sanders et al., 
2008) examined the size and activity of trader categories in the traditional 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Commitments of Traders 
(COT) reports, the Commodity Index Trader (CIT) reports, and the Bank Partici-
pation (BP) report. The authors find no pervasive evidence that the speculative 
                                                 
1 A 'long position' means the holder of the position, i.e. futures contract owns the security and will 
profit if the price of the security goes up. In contrast, 'short selling' or short hedging occurs when the 
seller does not yet own the commodity at the time of the sale but intends to purchase the commodity 
at a later date. Short selling is done with intent of later purchasing at a lower price. Short-sellers at-
tempt to profit from an expected decline in price. 
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levels of 2008 were in excess of those recorded historically for agricultural fu-
tures markets. 
 The second study was done by David Kass, Senior Economist at the Division 
of Market Oversight of the CFTC1, who gave a presentation during a roundtable 
discussion on April 22 2008, organised by the CFTC.2 The Roundtable dis-
cussed several issues linked to the volatility on commodity markets, including 
the impact of financial players such as speculators and index traders on the 
functioning of the markets and the commercial players. Kass presented data on 
grain markets and gave an analysis of whether the price increase was caused 
by speculation. In his presentation he concluded: 
 
'So we find it hard to find a direct relationship between the amount of in-
dex trading by percent or otherwise versus some of the volatility and 
some of the price rises we've seen of late. At least there's no simple 
analysis.' 
 
 Finally, on the question whether speculation by large MNEs has contributed 
to higher prices, Irwin (2008) makes the following point. In order to impact the 
equilibrium price of commodities in the cash market, index investors would have 
to take delivery and/or buy quantities in the cash market and hold these inven-
tories off the market. There is absolutely no evidence that index fund investors 
are taking delivery and owning stocks of commodities. Furthermore, the scale 
of this effort would have to be immense to manipulate a world-wide cash market 
as large as the crude oil market, and there simply is no evidence that index 
funds are engaged to that extent in the cash market activities. 
 To conclude, although there has been an increase in speculative invest-
ments, there are valid arguments against the claim that these investments 
caused high grains prices. Second, there is little empirical evidence to support 
this claim. We therefore conclude that the peak in grains prices in 2008 did not, 
in fact, constitute a 'bubble' but was a result of underlying demand and supply 
dynamics as described in section 2.3. 
 
                                                 
1 The CFTC is independent agency with the mandate to regulate commodity futures and option mar-
kets in the United States. 
2 CFTC (2008), Agricultural Forum, 22 April 2008. Presentations are available at tinyurl.com/bz2fbp. 
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5.2.4 Other effects of speculation? 
 
Another claim that is often made is that the growing influence of speculative in-
terests has recently led to a lack of convergence between cash and futures 
prices (National Grain and Feed Association cited in Laws, 2008). The difference 
between futures prices and cash prices is called the 'basis'. The two prices are 
supposed to converge on the date when futures expire because you cannot 
have two different prices at the same time at the same place for the same 
commodity. The basis on the day of delivery is thus supposed to be zero. How-
ever, in the past period, futures prices have been higher than cash prices. Many 
believe that the lack of convergence is symptomatic of a poorly functioning fu-
tures market or a result of excessive speculation. Well-functioning futures mar-
kets have a price discovery role for those involved in grains business. For 
instance, a farmer making planting decisions at the beginning of the year will do 
this on the basis of expected future prices; cooperatives use futures prices to 
commit to purchases of their members. When futures and cash prices no longer 
converge, the price signal is no longer reliable. There are several factors that 
play a role in convergence (Harris, 2008): 
1. Cost of storing the commodity: high storage costs can be expected when 
storage facilities are scarce and this will widen the basis; 
2. Value of having immediate access to the commodity; 
3. Cost of delivering the commodity according to the contract: with the high 
oil prices, freight rates have been at a historical high, thus increasing the 
cost of deliverance; 
4. Arbitrage activity: arbitrage consists of examining the three previous fac-
tors for profit potential. If there is no convergence and this is due to true 
mispricing, arbitrageurs would short futures and buy in the spot market to 
deliver on these contracts, thus rectifying the lack of convergence. 
 
 According to Harris (2008), the higher costs of storage and freight rates are 
the best explanations for the lack of convergence and there is no reason to con-
clude that excessive speculation has contributed to the lack of convergence. 
Again, we can conclude that there is no strong argument to believe that high 
speculative investments have led to a lack of convergence in the cash and fu-
tures market. What we may conclude is that 2008 has been an exceptional 
year, in which different factors that created a 'perfect storm' have influenced 
grains markets, as was explained in figure 2.7. 
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5.3 High commodity prices and MNE profits 
 
Chapter 2, on price trends in the global grain sector, explains that the price fluc-
tuations - a sharp increase during 2006-2008 and a sharp fall in the second half 
of 2008 - are caused by a complex set of factors that determine supply and 
demand of grains and consequently their prices. In the period when food prices 
increased all over the world, the large agri-businesses reported record profits. 
In this section we will try to determine how the MNEs have been able to achieve 
these results. 
 
5.3.1 Bunge 
 
Table 5.1 shows the annual results of Bunge for 2007 and 2008. It shows that 
volumes traded increased slightly (1%) except for fertiliser, which decreased 
with 15%. However, net sales and also gross profits increased significantly (with 
39% and 60% respectively). Net sales and gross profits are much higher while 
volumes remained the same and we may assume that Bunge has been able to 
take advantage of higher selling prices, even when its input costs may also have 
increased. 
 Bunge was able to produce record results in one of the most volatile years. 
In 2008 the company earned over USD1b. in net income for the first time in its 
existence and produced USD2.5b. of cash flow from operations. Bunge has 
been able to achieve these results by high demand and resulting high prices and 
therefore high profits: with only 1% increase in volume, it has generated an in-
crease of 60% in gross profits. However, in its fourth quarter (not in the table), 
when worldwide prices were decreasing, Bunge made a loss of USD210m. on 
its agribusiness, fertiliser, and edible oil sectors. The fourth quarter included a 
charge of approximately USD185m. related to counterparty risk provisions re-
sulting from a combination of the depressed global economy and the adverse 
impact of significant declines in agricultural commodity, freight and energy 
prices on certain customers. There were also foreign exchange losses of 
USD749m. due to US dollar-denominated financing of working capital and de-
valuations. 
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Table 5.1 Financial overview of Bunge year results (2007 and 2008) 
 2007 2008 % change 
Volumes (metric tonnes)  
Agribusiness 114,365 117,661 3 
Fertiliser 13,077 11,134 -15 
Edible oil products 5,530 5,736 4 
Milling products 3,983 3,932 -1 
Total 136,955 138,463 1 
  
Net sales (million USD)  
Agribusiness 26,990 36,688 36 
Fertiliser 3,918 5,860 50 
Edible oil products 5,597 8,216 47 
Milling products 1,337 1,810 35 
Total 37,842 52,572 39 
  
Gross profits (million USD)  
Agribusiness 1,407 2,029 44% 
Fertiliser 639 1,449 127% 
Edible oil products 334 356 7% 
Milling products 135 202 50% 
Total 2,515 4,036 60% 
Source: Bunge (2008). 
 
 Although the decrease in prices and the general decline in the global econ-
omy has affected Bunge's fourth quarter results, Bunge expects 2009 to be 
another year with profits. Alberto Weisser, Bunge's Chairman and Chief Execu-
tive Officer said1: 
 
'First, periods of lower demand for our core products are generally short 
lived. People may cut back consumption during times of economic un-
certainty, but in the end, many of our products are the basic staples 
necessary to feed the world's growing population. […] Second, global 
commodity stocks remain tight, and this reality is being exacerbated by 
weather issues in South America. Even with lower economic growth, the 
                                                 
1 In Bunge Reports Fourth Quarter Results: tinyurl.com/dy4ofj. 
 70 
world will need additional supplies of crops. Current futures prices indi-
cate that the market will provide incentives for farmers to plant, and this 
should encourage fertiliser use. […] During this time we continue to take 
steps to lower costs and improve the efficiency of our asset network. We 
expect that the stronger US dollar should benefit the cost structures of 
our foreign operations. We are also investing for the long-term in our 
core businesses, and in complementary value chains such as sugar […].' 
 
 This statement basically asserts that because Bunge is involved in 'basic 
staples necessary to feed the world's growing population' Bunge is somewhat 
'recession-proof': the demand will always be there. By owning and increasing 
complementary value chains it is able to stabilise its income and maximise prof-
its. 
 
5.3.2 ADM 
 
Table 5.2 shows financial results of ADM from 2004 to 2008. Since 2004, 
ADM's net earnings have increased with 264%. Net sales increased with 93% in 
the same period. Compared to 2007, net sales increased with 59%. ADM's 
segment operations have increased in 2008: its oilseed operations with 67%, 
maize operations with 23%, its agricultural services with 66%. However, profits 
were mixed, with oilseeds processing and maize processing generating a loss. 
The oilseed processing sector lost because of decreased biodiesel margins in 
Europe. However, crushing and origination operating profits increased with 76% 
to USD727m. due principally to improved crushing margins in North and South 
America and improved fertiliser results in South America. 
 Maize processing generated a loss because:  
 
'the market price of maize rose due to increased demand, resulting in 
higher raw material costs for maize processing which were only partially 
passed on in the form of increased selling prices for sweeteners and 
starches' (ADM, 2008: 21). 
 
 The large profit in agricultural services was mainly a result of:  
 
'enhanced merchandising and handling margins caused by volatile global 
grain and freight markets, favourable risk management results, and to a 
lesser extent, increased sales volumes' (ADM, 2008: 24).  
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 Transportation operating profits decreased with 8% to USD144m. primarily 
due to increased fuel costs. 
 
Table 5.2 Financial Highlights ADM 
(in million USD) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 % 
change 
Net sales and other  
operating income  
36151 35943 36596 44,018 69,816 93 
Net earnings  495 1044 1312 2,162 1,802 a) 264 
  Net sales Profit 
 (in million USD) 2007 2008 % 
change
2007 2008 % 
change 
Oilseeds processing        
Crushing & origination 8,036 14,477 80% 414 727 76% 
Refining, packaging,  
biodiesel and other 
5,758 8,588 49% 202 181 -10% 
Asia 149 214 44% 523 132 -75% 
Total oilseeds  
processing 
13,943 23,279 67% 1,139 1,040 -9% 
Maize processing        
Sweeteners and starches 2,761 3,546 28% 509 529 4% 
Bio products 3,064 3,591 17% 596 432 -28% 
Total maize processing 5,825 7,137 23% 1,105 961 -13% 
Agricultural services        
Merchandising and handling 20,222 33,749 67% 382 873 129% 
Transportation 197 219 11% 156 144 -8% 
Total agricultural services 20,419 33,968 66% 538 1,017 89% 
Other        
Wheat, Cocoa and Malt 3,738 5,335 43% 209 217 4% 
Financial  93 97 4% 170 206 21% 
Total Other 3,831 5,432 42% 379 423 12% 
Total 44,018 69,816 59% 3,161 3,441 9% 
a) Earnings before income taxes decreased in 2008 due principally to gains totalling USD1.0b. before income tax 
on business disposals recorded in 2007. 
Source: ADM (2008). 
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 From table 5.2 it becomes clear that ADM does face risks due to fluctuating 
supply and prices. ADM list several risk factors among which: 
- The availability and price of the agricultural commodities and agricultural 
commodity products the company produces and merchandises can be af-
fected by weather, disease, government programs, competition, and various 
other factors beyond the company's control and could adversely affect the 
company's operating results; 
- Fluctuations in energy prices could adversely affect the company's operating 
results; 
- The company is subject to economic downturns, political instability and other 
risks of doing business globally which could adversely affect the company's 
operating results (ADM, 2008: 10). 
 
 Although ADM has reported losses in its oilseed and maize processing seg-
ments, and transport due to higher commodity and fuel prices, it has been able 
to increase its overall segment profits with 9%. So how was ADM able to gener-
ate profits despite higher commodity and fuel prices? Table 5.2 already pro-
vides an indication for this. In some cases, ADM did profit from higher selling 
prices for, for instance oilseeds and fertiliser. And it profited from merchandis-
ing and handling, which makes up 25% of its 2008 profit. The same Annual Re-
port of ADM (ADM, 2008:3-4) gives further insight into this question (our 
emphasis included): 
 
'ADM's procurement network includes more than 300 facilities on six 
continents, and we continue to add capacity in strategically important 
geographic areas as customer demand and new opportunities warrant. 
[…] Our more than 230 processing plants around the world generate a 
remarkable array of products made from maize, wheat, cocoa, oilseeds 
and other feedstocks, and the breadth of our operations gives us flexibil-
ity to adjust our manufacturing activities to respond to shifts in a dy-
namic global marketplace. […] In a changing world, with volatile 
commodity prices and evolving consumer preferences, we work with 
customers to provide cost-effective solutions from among the array of 
ingredients we create from the crops we process. This year, as crop 
prices rose, we collaborated with feed customers to identify affordable 
nutrient blends using alternatives such as canola meal, soybean meal 
and distiller's dried grains combined with advanced nutritional additives. 
Our insight into crop availability - combined with our global sourcing net-
work, delivery capabilities and processing efficiencies - helped to keep 
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products moving to customers despite market and weather-related dis-
ruptions.' 
 Through its breadth of operation (and global sourcing network) which gives 
ADM flexibility, ADM is able to generate profits. 
 
5.3.3 Cargill 
 
Cargill earned USD3.95b. in the fiscal year1 2008, up 69% from the prior year 
and sixth consecutive year of record financial performance. Cargill does not re-
port annual results but results per fiscal year (1 June 2007-31 May 2008) - see 
table 5.3 for more figures. 
 
Table 5.3 Financial Highlights Cargill 2007-2008 
Fiscal year a) 
USD in millions 2008 2007 % change  
Sales and other revenues 120,439 88,266 36 
Net earnings 3,951 2,343 69 
Cash flow from operations 7,012 3,965 77 
Annual year b) 
Net earnings in million USD 2008 2007 % change  
3rd quarter Dec - Feb 29 1,030 553 86 
4th quarter Mar - May 31 744 628 18 
1st quarter Jun - Aug 31 1,490 917 62 
2nd quarter Sep - Nov 31 1,190 945 25 
Total 4,454 3,043 46 
a) Cargill does not publish its financial report for the general public. More data was not available to the authors; 
b) Compiled through Cargill Press Releases and tinyurl.com/apq366. 
 
 According to Greg Page, Cargill's chairman and chief executive officer, Car-
gill has been able to achieve a record financial performance in the fiscal year 
2008 - which was a year of exceptionally strong commodity demand, market 
turbulence and price risk - by using its business diversity, the full capacity of its 
global assets, strong risk management and a significant increase in capital de-
ployed. Mr Page said Cargill's investment in the fertiliser industry also contrib-
uted significantly to company results (Cargill Press Release 19 August 2008). 
                                                 
1 The fiscal year does not coincide with 2008 but starts in June 2007. This is why we have added two 
tables - one for the fiscal year and one for the annual year. 
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 Cargill's first-quarter results (fiscal year 2009) received a substantial boost 
from its investment in the fertiliser industry through its holdings in The Mosaic 
Company, which mines, manufactures, markets and distributes fertiliser around 
the world. Among Cargill's five business segments, the increase in first-quarter 
earnings was thus led by the industrial segment, which reflected continued de-
mand for crop nutrients in response to the world's increased need for higher 
crop yields (Cargill Press Release 13 October 2008). 
 Results in the second quarter (fiscal year 2009) were led by its origination 
and processing segment (including grains) and by its industrial segment (includ-
ing fertilisers), both of which increased earnings significantly from the second 
quarter a year ago. Cargill's fertiliser business through The Mosaic Company 
was a significant contributor to company results. Excluding earnings from that 
investment, Cargill's second-quarter results were moderately below the year-ago 
level and, in the first half, just under the same period a year ago. Earnings in ag-
riculture services decreased moderately. Results declined overall in the food in-
gredients and applications segment, with steady or improved performance in 
some food ingredient and meat units offset by weaker performance elsewhere. 
The risk management and financial segment incurred a loss related to financial 
markets activities. At the same time, the segment's energy businesses jointly 
surpassed last year's second-quarter earnings by a significant margin (Cargill 
Press Release 13 January 2009). 
 The analysis of the financial results of Cargill makes clear that its fertiliser as 
well as origination and processing segment (including grain and oilseed supply 
chain) have contributed in a significant way to its financial results. Like the other 
MNEs, the second half of 2008 was more difficult as the global economy 
slowed down and the financial crisis ensued. Also in line with the other two 
MNEs, Cargill is able to be flexible, using it worldwide sourcing network and 
business diversity. 
 
5.3.4 The sources of profit of MNEs 
 
The analysis of the financial annual reports of Bunge, ADM and Cargill provides 
us several clues about the relationship between the high food prices and record 
profits of the MNEs. First of all, they did seem to have profited from the high 
demand for commodities such as grain as well as inputs such as fertiliser and 
the resulting high prices. The second half of 2008 - when the global economy 
slowed down and prices decreased - appears to have been more difficult for the 
MNEs. However, Cargill did report that it still made profits from its fertiliser 
business, because demand increased. 
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 Because the large agribusiness corporations have sourcing and selling loca-
tions all over the world, they are flexible in managing supply, demand and price 
differences. This is how they manage to continue to achieve high earnings. Car-
gill reported that it was able to manage risk because the company was able to 
'respond to supply-and-demand fundamentals in fast-moving markets'. Farmers 
and consumers on the other hand do not have this flexibility and are increasingly 
faced with fluctuating input and output prices. Vorley (2003) makes the point 
that global commodity traders actually seem to rely on market instability for 
their profitability. According to him, disruption and instability in trading patterns 
allow MNEs to use their superior market intelligence to capture the profits re-
sulting from such instability. Having diverse sources of supply to draw from al-
lows traders to exploit temporary opportunities for profit. Our analysis seems to 
confirm this analysis. 
 In the past years, tariffs, quotas, and duties have been reduced worldwide, 
in effect reducing the economic borders between nations. Farmers in different 
countries increasingly compete in the same international market. At the same 
time, the reduction in trade barriers seems to have facilitated agribusiness 
mergers reducing competition for these corporations. The process of corporate 
concentration has accelerated and increased the rate at which locally-owned ag-
ricultural processing plants are taken over by foreign-owned corporations. 
These trade agreements have boosted the volume of agricultural commodity 
trade exports. Thus two opposing trends can be distinguished: more competi-
tion for farmers and less competition for large scale agribusiness. 
 Large agribusiness firms have their own international trade priorities, which 
do not necessarily coincide with national interests. Cargill's subsidiary in for in-
stance Canada does not directly 'compete' with its parent company, but rather 
pursues measures which will benefit the parent company's bottom line (NFU, 
2008). 
 We have to note that not all food-related companies have benefited from the 
high prices. Companies that work most directly with farmers, such as Cargill, 
Bunge and ADM, are gaining the most from higher food and grain prices, while 
companies further along in the food chain have had a difficult time passing 
along the higher food prices to consumers (Kesmodel et al., 2008). USA com-
panies such as Tyson Foods Inc., Pilgrim's Pride Crop., Smithfield Foods, Dean 
Foods and Kraft Foods all posted losses over 2007. Prices for purchasing their 
raw materials went up more than prices for their products. However, large food 
companies such as Nestlé SA, Groupe Danone SA and Unilever have passed on 
higher prices to consumers with apparently little or no impact on profits (Kes-
model et al., 2008). 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
Based on the data and research we have analysed, we find no strong evidence 
that speculation by index funds on the futures commodity markets has led to 
higher grain prices. Firstly, although there has been a large flow of speculative 
money into the futures commodity markets, total trade in the futures markets 
(including non-speculative trade) has increased as well, so that the share of 
speculative trade has not increased much. Secondly, no clear cause and effect 
relationship can be established between the increase in speculative trade and 
higher prices. It might well be that the causation is the other way round: increas-
ing prices led to more speculation. There has been concern about the fact that 
the futures and cash prices on futures commodity markets no longer converge 
(the futures prices are higher than cash prices). This has also been attributed to 
speculation. However, again, there is no evidence that this is the cause. The 
cause may also lie in the storage and freight costs which have risen considera-
bly as demand for commodities increased and fuel cost soared. 
 There is no evidence either that the dominant MNEs active in grain trade 
(Bunge, Cargill and ADM) have pushed up prices. They would only be able to do 
this by hoarding commodities such as grains on a large scale, but the data 
shows that in fact, stocks decreased in the past years. There is more evidence 
that they did profit from high commodity prices although the evidence is some-
what mixed. In some cases they have clearly been able to profit demand for 
commodities was high and those firms operating close to farmers could in-
crease their margins. However, in some cases the high commodity prices re-
sulted in a net loss, for instance for ADM, because the costs of purchasing the 
commodities have also increased. 
 Whether the MNEs could profit depends on two factors. First, the timing: 
whether they could buy at low prices and sell against high prices. Second, the 
power that the MNEs can exert in setting margins. The large agribusinesses 
have a global sourcing network that gives them the flexibility to source where 
prices are relatively low, to adjust manufacturing activities to respond to shifts 
in a dynamic global marketplace. On the second account, the large agri-
businesses dominate a large share of the market and own not just one segment 
of the business but a complex that includes input as well as output. This puts 
them into a good position to gear supply to demand and to determine margins. 
 To build on these advantages, the MNEs continue to expand and merge. The 
trend towards more free trade has clearly facilitated their ability to source glob-
ally. The MNEs are therefore able to deal with higher price volatility. By contrast, 
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farmers will face more difficulties when prices will fluctuate, especially in the 
face of increasing competition in a more free trade environment. 
 This study could not go in-depth into the strategies of the large MNEs and 
their effect on how international grains markets are organised. A more in-depth 
study on the strategies of large MNEs (not limited to grains markets) is recom-
mended. 
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6 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
 
6.1 Overview of the international grain markets and positions 
 
This report has described the various factors that underlie the agricultural 
commodity price increases of 2006-2008 and the price drop that started in the 
second half of 2008. These include long-term as well as short-term factors in 
supply and demand. The last decade has seen a gradual increase of demand for 
food and feed due to increasing income developments, especially in some of 
the larger emerging economies of the world. As just a small percentage of 
world production is traded, the world market price for grains is very sensitive to 
supply and demand shifts. A major cause of high prices has been the lowering 
of expensive global grain stocks by various countries (which could have acted 
as a buffer), combined with the fact that production growth has been only barely 
been keeping up with demand growth. Other, short-term factors that contributed 
to the peak included expansion of biofuel production facilitated by government 
policies, dollar devaluation, rising farm production costs (due to increased fuel 
and fertiliser costs) and reduced supply through failed harvests. A new factor is 
the financial crisis which has hit the world since the 'credit crunch' of October 
2008 when banks started failing and lending froze. It seems that this will have 
an impact on farmers since they face difficulties in obtaining credit both from 
banks and agribusiness. 
 Whether prices will continue to fall as they have done in last months of 
2008, or whether they will go back to their high levels of 2007/08 is unclear 
and depends on many factors. What seems to be clear, however, is that price 
volatility will continue to be an important factor in the future. Price ups and 
downs will follow each other more rapidly. 
 
 
6.2 Increasing market concentration 
 
World grain trade constitutes only a small share of world production (from 7% 
for rice to 18% for wheat). This global trade is handled increasingly by a handful 
of companies. Cargill, ADM and Bunge are the major players. In the grains mar-
ket (and food markets in general) there is a continuing trend towards horizontal 
and vertical integration. An important reason for firms to engage in such merg-
ers is reduced competition in global food markets and increased economies of 
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scale. Large MNEs such as Cargill, ADM and Bunge engage in various collabora-
tive contracts with large MNEs that specialise in inputs (such as agrochemicals, 
seeds etc). Such 'food clusters' wield much power in terms of decisions about 
what is produced, what is consumed and on what basis these decisions are 
made. 
 Although such food clusters are increasing in importance, there is relatively 
little good quality and up to date data on them. We therefore recommend further 
research into the market behaviour of food clusters and the impact of this type 
of concentration and business collusion on market competition. More specifi-
cally, the question is how and to what extent MNEs can influence prices, and if 
they can, what government policies would be optimal to ensure a real or 'fair' 
competitive market environment. 
 
 
6.3 Supply chain linkages 
 
While the global grain trade is increasingly characterised by horizontal and ver-
tical integration, farmers all over the world face increasing competition. Tech-
nology has increased agricultural productivity, but has also depressed prices 
(by increasing supply). Farmers in developed as well as developing countries 
find themselves in a 'technological treadmill'. A large number of producers face 
a few large buyers that determine the market conditions. These factors explain 
why throughout the world, net incomes of farmers have not increased much or 
have even decreased. Farmers might counter this situation by organising them-
selves and protecting their interests. 
 In Sub-Saharan Africa, the situation is somewhat different from the situation 
of grain farmers in developed markets, Latin America and Asia. The reason for 
this is that the large MNEs are hardly active in the grain sector. Most African 
grain markets are characterised by high fragmentation: trade is carried out by a 
multitude of small traders. Domestic grain markets are highly influenced by do-
mestic and regional supply and demand factors rather than international mar-
kets. A failed harvest in one region, for instance, pushes up prices in that 
region, as well as neighbouring regions. Many grains produced and traded in Af-
rica are not trade internationally. Transaction and transport costs are relatively 
high in Africa, which leads to low price transmission, i.e. high international pri-
ces are not translated to high local prices or only with a substantial time lag. Al-
though international grain prices have a limited effect on African domestic 
markets, the high fertiliser prices in the international market did have significant 
consequences for local fertiliser prices, which increased considerably. Many 
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farmers in Africa are net buyers of food, and thus they will not benefit from hig-
her grain prices, while they are hurt by higher fertiliser prices. 
 The study shows that the MNEs are not active in the trade and milling of ce-
reals in Africa, which might be due to the high transaction and transport costs 
that exist in the agricultural sector. However, it requires further research to get 
a good quality and in-depth picture of the MNEs strategies with respect to Af-
rica. A recent trend in Africa has been the lease of huge areas of agricultural 
land to countries and companies from the Middle East and Asia. Although this 
was not part of our study, it does show the interest of large and powerful play-
ers in the African agricultural sector (i.e. land), which might be worthwhile to in-
vestigate. It might also be worthwhile to execute a study of the role of the three 
large MNEs in Asian and Latin American grain trade, where they appear to be 
much more active. 
 
 
6.4 Influence of speculation and MNEs on price setting 
 
Based on the data and research we have analysed, we find no strong evidence 
that speculation by index funds on the futures commodity markets has led to 
higher grain prices. Firstly, although there has been a large flow of speculative 
money into the futures commodity markets, total trade in the futures markets 
(including non-speculative trade) has increased as well, so that the share of 
speculative trade has not increased much. Secondly, no clear cause and effect 
relationship can be established between the increase in speculative trade and 
higher prices. It might well be that the causation is the other way round: increas-
ing prices led to more speculation. There has been concern about the fact that 
the futures and cash prices on futures commodity markets no longer converge: 
the futures prices are higher than cash prices. This has also been attributed to 
speculation. However, again, there is no evidence that this is the cause. The 
cause may also lie in the storage and freight costs which have risen considera-
bly as demand for commodities increased and fuel cost soared. 
 There is no evidence either that the dominant MNEs active in grain trade 
(Bunge, Cargill and ADM) have pushed up prices. They would only be able to do 
this by hoarding commodities such as grains on a large scale, but the data 
show that in fact, stocks decreased in the past years. There is more evidence 
that they did profit from high commodity prices although the evidence is some-
what mixed. In some cases they have clearly been able to profit as demand for 
commodities was high and those firms operating close to farmers could in-
crease their margins. However, in some cases the high commodity prices re-
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sulted in a net loss, for instance for ADM, because the costs of purchasing the 
commodities have also increased. 
 Whether the MNEs could profit depends at least on two factors. First, the 
timing: whether they could buy at low prices and sell against high prices. Sec-
ond, the power that the MNEs can exert in setting margins. The large agribusi-
nesses have a global sourcing network that gives them the flexibility to source 
where prices are relatively low and to adjust manufacturing activities to respond 
to shifts in a dynamic global marketplace. On the second account, the large 
agri-businesses dominate the market and own not just one segment of the busi-
ness but a complex that includes inputs as well as outputs. This puts them into 
a good position to gear supply to demand and to determine margins. 
 To build on these advantages, the MNEs continue to expand and merge. The 
trend towards more free trade has clearly facilitated their ability to source glob-
ally. The MNEs are therefore able to deal with higher price volatility. By contrast, 
farmers will face more difficulties when prices will fluctuate, especially in the 
face of increasing competition in a more free trade environment. 
This study could not go into details of the strategies of the large MNEs and their 
effect on the organisation of international grains markets. A more in-depth study 
on the strategies of large MNEs (not limited to grains markets) is recom-
mended. 
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